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Abstract We present a novel, automated way to find differential paths for MD5. Its
main application is in the construction of chosen-prefix collisions. We have shown how, at
an approximate expected cost of 239 calls to the MD5 compression function, for any two
chosen message prefixes P and P ′, suffixes S and S′ can be constructed such that the
concatenated values P‖S and P ′‖S′ collide under MD5. The practical attack potential of
this construction of chosen-prefix collisions is of greater concern than the MD5-collisions
that were published before. This is illustrated by a pair of MD5-based X.509 certificates
one of which was signed by a commercial Certification Authority (CA) as a legitimate
website certificate, while the other one is a certificate for a rogue CA that is entirely
under our control (cf. http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/). Other examples,
such as MD5-colliding executables, are presented as well. More details can be found on
http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/ChosenPrefixCollisions/.
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions. Modern information se-
curity methods heavily rely on cryptographic hash func-
tions, functions that map bitstrings of arbitrary length to
fixed-length bitstrings called hash values. Cryptographic
hash functions are designed in such a way that a num-
ber of security related conditions are satisfied: collision
resistance, second pre-image resistance and pre-image
resistance. Commonly used cryptographic hash functions
are MD5 (Rivest, 1992), SHA-1, and SHA-256 (NIST,
2008), mapping their inputs to fixed-lengths outputs of
128, 160, and 256 bits, respectively. We refer to (Menezes,
van Oorschot, and Vanstone, 1996) for a description of
the iterated design principle of these hash functions and
the above security properties. The focus of this article
is MD5’s collision resistance: it should be practically in-
feasible to find two different inputs that have the same
MD5 hash value.
Previous results on collision attacks for MD5. In Au-
gust 2004 at the rump session of the annual CRYPTO
conference in Santa Barbara, Xiaoyun Wang (cf. (Wang
et al., 2004)) presented a pair of two-block messages that
collide under MD5. The details of their attack construc-
tion were presented by Wang and Yu in (Wang and Yu,
2005). It describes a manually found differential path for
MD5 and introduces the concept of near-collision blocks :
a pair of input blocks that results in specifically targeted
output-differences. It allows computation of a new col-
lision in a few hours of CPU time. Improved versions
of these attacks are commented on at the end of this
section.
Impact of previous results. Although Wang et al.’s ran-
dom looking collisions for MD5 by themselves do not pose
any danger, it was shown in (Kaminsky, 2004) and (Mikle,
2004) how those original collisions can be used to mis-
lead integrity checking software and replace benign files
with malicious versions without detection. Furthermore,
it was immediately clear that any value can be used
for the IHV (in this paper the chaining variable will be
denoted by IHV, for Intermediate Hash Value) at the be-
ginning of the two-block collision search, not just MD5’s
initial value as in their example collision. This freedom to
choose the IHV allowed several authors to use this attack
construction for slightly more ulterior purposes, e.g. by
inserting both collision blocks in different Postscript doc-
uments that collide under MD5 (cf. (Daum and Lucks,
2005)).
None of these developments in the collision attacks
for MD5 spoke in favor of continued usage of MD5, but
the potential for abuse of these types of collisions was
limited. Initially, serious misuse was believed to be pre-
vented by the lack of control over the contents of the
collision blocks. In (Lenstra and de Weger, 2005) it was
shown, however, that for any pair of meaningless data
(M,M ′) a suffix T can easily be found such that both con-
catenations M‖T and M ′‖T are fully meaningful. This
allows the following attack construction. First, for any
meaningful common prefix P , collision blocks (M,M ′)
may be constructed using Wang and Yu’s approach such
that P‖M and P‖M ′ collide under MD5. Even though
P‖M and P‖M ′ can be expected to be partially mean-
ingless, an appendage T can subsequently be calculated
such that both P‖M‖T and P‖M ′‖T are fully meaning-
ful. Furthermore, due to the iterative structure of MD5,
they also still collide under MD5. This shows that the
argument that MD5-collisions of this form are mostly
harmless because of their lack of structure is in principle
invalid. The above attack construction allowed the real-
ization of two different X.509 certificates with identical
Distinguished Names and identical MD5-based signatures
but different public keys (cf. (Lenstra and de Weger,
2005)). Such pairs of certificates theoretically violate the
security of the X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, however
the limitation to identical Distinguished Names does not
allow abuse in practice.
Scenarios causing more serious threats did not emerge
due to a severe limitation of this collision attack, namely
that both colliding messages must have identical IHVs
at the beginning of the collision blocks. This requirement
is most naturally fulfilled by making the documents iden-
tical up to that point. Therefore, we call such collisions
identical-prefix collisions. In the above example, P would
be the identical prefix.
New contributions. The most important contribution of
this paper is the removal of the identical prefix condi-
tion leading to chosen-prefix collisions, a result that we
originally presented at EUROCRYPT 2007 (cf. (Stevens,
Lenstra, and de Weger, 2007)), and of which a consider-
ably improved version was first presented at CRYPTO
2009 (cf. (Stevens et al., 2009)). Here we present a full
description of our improved chosen-prefix collision attack.
We show how any pair of IHVs can be made to collide un-
der MD5 by appending properly chosen collision blocks.
More precisely, we show how, for any two chosen message
prefixes P and P ′, suffixes S and S′ can be constructed
such that the concatenated values P‖S and P ′‖S′ collide
under MD5. Such collisions will be called chosen-prefix
collisions (though different-prefix collisions would have
been appropriate as well). Our attack construction is
based on a ‘‘birthday’’ search combined with a novel, au-
tomated way to find differential paths for MD5. It has
an approximate expected cost of 239 calls to the MD5
compression function. In practical terms, this translates
to about a day on a standard quad-core PC per chosen-
prefix collision. This notable improvement over the 6
months on thousands of PCs for a single chosen-prefix
collision that we reported earlier in the EUROCRYPT
2007 paper (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger, 2007), was
triggered by the application presented in the CRYPTO
2009 paper (Stevens et al., 2009).
Significance and impact of the new contributions.
Chosen-prefix collisions have a greater threat potential
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than identical-prefix ones. Using the diamond construc-
tion from Kelsey and Kohno (cf. (Kelsey and Kohno,
2006)) along with chosen-prefix collisions, any number
of documents of one’s choice can be made to collide af-
ter extending them with relatively short and innocuously
looking appendages that can easily remain hidden to
the unsuspicious reader when popular document formats
(such as PDF, Postscript, or MS Word) are used. We il-
lustrate this in Section 5.3 with a Nostradamus attack
to predict the winner of the 2008 US Presidential elec-
tions. Implementing a herding attack we constructed 12
different but MD5-colliding PDF files, each predicting a
different winner. Their common hash serves as commit-
ment to our prediction of the outcome. Our prediction
was correct.
Similarly, chosen-prefix collisions can be used to mis-
lead, for instance, download integrity verification of code
signing schemes, by appending collision blocks to executa-
bles. Details, and how it improves upon previous such
constructions, can be found in Section 5.4.
The most convincing application of MD5-collisions,
however, would target the core of the Public Key In-
frastructure (PKI) and truly undermine its security by
affecting authenticity of users (cf. Section 4.1 of (Stevens,
Lenstra, and de Weger, 2007)). The most obvious way
to realize this would be by constructing colliding certifi-
cates, i.e., certificates for which the to-be-signed parts
have the same cryptographic hash and therefore the same
digital signature. This is undesirable, because the signa-
ture of one of the to-be-signed parts, as provided by a
Certification Authority (CA), is also a valid signature
for the other to-be-signed part. Thus, this gives rise to
a pair of certificates, one of which is legitimate, but the
other one is a rogue certificate.
Constructing colliding certificates that affect authen-
ticity seemed to be out of reach, however. As mentioned
in the EUROCRYPT 2007 paper (Stevens, Lenstra, and
de Weger, 2007) that introduced chosen-prefix collisions,
these collisions allow us to construct two X.509 certifi-
cates with different Distinguished Names and different
public keys, but identical MD5-based signatures. This
improves upon the construction from (Lenstra and de
Weger, 2005) mentioned above, but is hardly more threat-
ening due to two problems. In the first place, we need full
control over the prefixes of the certificates’ to-be-signed
parts, to be able to calculate the collision blocks. When
using a ‘real life’ CA, however, that CA has final control
over the contents of one of the to-be-signed parts: in par-
ticular, it inserts a serial number and a validity period.
Furthermore, our construction as in (Stevens, Lenstra,
and de Weger, 2007) results in 8192-bit RSA moduli,
which is quite a bit longer than the 2048-bit upper bound
that is enforced by some CAs.
It was pointed out to us by three of our coauthors on
the CRYPTO 2009 follow-up paper (Stevens et al., 2009),
that there are circumstances where, with sufficiently high
probability, the first of the above two problems can be
circumvented. Naively, one would expect that a some-
what more extensive search would suffice to address the
remaining problem of reducing the length of the RSA
moduli to a generally acceptable 2048 bits. Substantially
more extensive improvements to all stages of the origi-
nal chosen-prefix construction from the EUROCRYPT
2007 paper (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger, 2007) were
required, though. This is a nice illustration of scientific
progress being driven by practical applications. Further-
more, more computational power had to be brought to
bear to deal with the timing restrictions of reliably pre-
dicting the CA’s contribution. Ultimately this led to the
rogue CA certificate mentioned in the abstract, gener-
ated in about a day on a cluster of 215 PlayStation 3
game consoles. With the private key of a CA under one’s
control, one can create ‘trusted’ certificates at will. This
effectively allows one to perform a man-in-the-middle at-
tack for all secure websites against users whose means of
electronic communications have been subverted. We pur-
posely crippled our rogue CA certificate to prevent such
misuse. From the heartwarming industry reception of our
rogue CA construction, which is further described in Sec-
tion 5.2, it must be concluded that we finally managed to
present a sufficiently convincing argument to discontinue
usage of MD5 for digital signature applications. Further-
more, we would like to note that browser vendors such as
Microsoft, Mozilla and Google and other software compa-
nies, can revoke the trust in any CA certificate in their
products if deemed necessary.
Very brief summary of new techniques. The possibility
of chosen-prefix collisions was mentioned already in (Gau-
ravaram, McCullagh, and Dawson, 2006, Section 4.2 case
1) and, in the context of SHA-1, in (de Cannie`re and Rech-
berger, 2006) and on http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/
content/research/krypto/sha1/. This paper is an up-
dated version of the EUROCRYPT 2007 paper (Stevens,
Lenstra, and de Weger, 2007), incorporating the improve-
ments mentioned above and as described in (Stevens,
2007) and in the CRYPTO 2009 paper (Stevens et al.,
2009). The new applications mentioned above have been
realized using the following main improvements. In the
first place we introduce an extended family of differen-
tial paths compared to (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger,
2007). Secondly, we use a more powerful birthday search
procedure which reduces the overall complexity from
250 to 239 MD5 compression function calls. This proce-
dure also introduces a time-memory trade-off and more
flexibility in the birthday search complexity to allow
for variability in the expected number of near-collision
blocks. Finally, we have a much improved implementa-
tion exploiting the wide variety of features of a cluster
of PlayStation 3 game consoles.
Outline of article. MD5 and the Merkle-Damg˚ard con-
struction on which it is based are described in detail in
Section 2. Section 3 gives a high level overview of our
method to construct chosen-prefix collisions. Section 4
presents the method in full detail. The three proof of
concept applications are presented in Section 5.
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Table 1-1 Collision complexities -- Historical overview.
Claims preceded by ‘u:’ remain unpublished and ‘w:’ indicates that the paper was withdrawn. Complexity is given as
the number of calls to the relevant compression function (cf. Section 2). The figures are optimized for speed, i.e., for
collisions using any number of near-collision blocks. For other collision lengths the complexities may differ.
MD5
year identical-prefix chosen-prefix
pre-2004 264 (trivial) 264 (trivial)
2004 240 (Wang et al., 2004), (Wang and Yu, 2005)
2005 237 (Klima, 2005)
2006 232 (Klima, 2006), (Stevens, 2006) 249 (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger, 2007)
2007 225 (Stevens, 2007) 242
2008 221 (Xie, Liu, and Feng, 2008)
2009 216 (Stevens et al., 2009) 239 (Stevens et al., 2009)
SHA-1
year identical-prefix chosen-prefix
pre-2004 280 (trivial) 280 (trivial)
2005 269 (Wang, Yin, and Yu, 2005)
(u: 263) (Wang, Yao, and Yao, 2005)
2006 (u: 280−) (Rechberger, 2006)
2007 (u: 261) (Mendel, Rechberger, and Rijmen, 2007)
2008
2009 (w: 252) (McDonald, Hawkes, and Pieprzyk, 2009)
2012 265 Stevens (2012) 277 Stevens (2012)
Other improvements of Wang et al.’s original collision
finding method. Another application of our automated
differential path finding method is a speedup of the
identical-prefix collision attack by Wang et al. In combi-
nation with the idea of tunnels from Klima (Klima, 2006)
collisions can be found in 225 MD5 compression function
calls, see (Stevens, 2007). Source and binary code for this
improvement is available on http://www.win.tue.nl/
hashclash/). Note that Xie, Liu and Feng (Xie, Liu, and
Feng, 2008) used a different method for identical-prefix
collisions, reaching a complexity of 221 MD5 compres-
sion function calls, and that in the meantime identical-
prefix collisions for MD5 can be found in 216 MD5 com-
pression function calls (Stevens et al., 2009). This new
identical-prefix collision attack is used in Section 4.8 to
construct very short chosen-prefix collisions with complex-
ity of about 253.2 MD5 compressions, where the collision-
causing suffixes are only 596 bits long instead of several
thousands of bits.
Summary of old and new results. In Table 1-1 we present
a historical overview of the decline in complexity of MD5
and SHA-1 collision finding. For historical interest we
include claims that were presented but that have never
been published (indicated by ‘‘u: ...’’ in Table 1-1) and
a claim that has been withdrawn (indicated by ‘‘w: ...’’
in Table 1-1). It clearly illustrates that attacks against
MD5 keep getting better, and that the situation around
SHA-1 is unclear. Not reflected in the table is the fact
that already in 1993 it was known that there was serious
trouble with MD5, based on collisions in its compression
function (cf. (den Boer and Bosselaers, 1994), (Dobbertin,
1996)). We leave any speculation about the future of
SHA-1 cryptanalysis to the knowledgeable reader.
2 Merkle-Damg˚ard and MD5
In this section we describe the Merkle-Damg˚ard con-
struction in Section 2.1, then we fix some notation in
Section 2.2 and give a description of MD5 in Section 2.3.
2.1 Merkle-Damg˚ard
The well known Merkle-Damg˚ard construction describes
exactly how to construct a hash function based on a com-
pression function with fixed-size inputs in an iterative
structure as is depicted in Figure 1. Since it has been
proven that the hash function is collision resistant if the
underlying compression function is collision resistant, the
majority of all the currently used hash functions are based
on this Merkle-Damg˚ard construction. The construction
builds a hash function based on a compression function
that takes two fixed-size inputs, namely a chaining value
denoted by IHV and a message block, and outputs a
new IHV. For instance, MD5’s compression function op-
erates on an IHV of bit length 128 and a message block
consisting of 512 bits. An input message is first padded
with a single 1 bit followed by a number X of 0 bits and
lastly the original message length encoded in 64 bits. The
number X of 0 bits to be added is defined as the lowest
possible number so that the entire padded message bit
length is an integer multiple of 512. The padded message
is now split into N blocks of size exactly 512 bits. The
hash function starts with a fixed public value for IHV0
called the IV (Initial Value). For each subsequent mes-
sage block Mi it calls the compression function with the
current IHVi and the message block Mi and stores the
output as the new IHVi+1. After all blocks are processed
it outputs the last IHVN after an optional finalization
transform.
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Figure 1 Merkle-Damg˚ard construction
2.2 Preliminaries
MD5 operates on 32-bit words (v31v30 . . . v0) with vi ∈
{0, 1}, that are identified with elements v = ∑31i=0 vi2i of
Z/232Z (the ring of integers modulo 232, represented by
the set of least non-negative residues {0, 1, . . . , 232 − 1})
and referred to as 32-bit integers. In this paper we switch
freely between these representations.
A binary signed digit representation (BSDR) for a
32-bit word X is defined as (ki)
31
i=0, where
X =
31∑
i=0
2iki, ki ∈ {−1, 0,+1}.
Many different BSDRs exist for any non-zero X. The
weight of a BSDR is the number of non-zero ki’s. A
particularly useful BSDR is the Non-Adjacent Form
(NAF), where no two non-zero ki’s are adjacent. The
NAF is not unique since we work modulo 232 (making
k31 = +1 equivalent to k31 = −1), but uniqueness of the
NAF can be enforced by choosing k31 ∈ {0,+1}. Among
the BSDRs of an integer, the NAF has minimal weight
(cf. (Clark and Liang, 1973)). It can easily be computed
as NAF(n) = (ai − bi)31i=0 where ai, bi ∈ {0, 1} such that∑31
i=0 ai2
i = n+ bn2 c mod 232 and
∑31
i=0 bi2
i = bn2 c .
Integers are denoted in hexadecimal as, for instance,
1E16 and in binary as 000111102. For bitstrings X and
Y we use the following notation:
• X ∧ Y is the bitwise AND of X and Y ;
• X ∨ Y is the bitwise OR of X and Y ;
• X ⊕ Y is the bitwise XOR of X and Y ;
• X is the bitwise complement of X;
for X,Y ∈ Z/232Z:
• X[i] is the i-th bit of the regular binary represen-
tation of X;
• X + Y resp.X − Y is the addition resp. subtraction
modulo 232;
• RL(X,n) (resp. RR(X,n)) is the cyclic left (resp.
right) rotation of X by n bit positions:
RL(10100100 . . . 000000012, 5)
= 100 . . . 00000001101002;
and for a 32-digit BSDR X:
• X[[i]] is the i-th signed bit of X;
• RL(X,n) (resp. RR(X,n)) is the cyclic left (resp.
right) rotation of X by n positions.
• w(X) is the weight of X.
For chosen message prefixes P and P ′ we seek suffixes
S and S′ such that the messages P‖S and P ′‖S′ collide
under MD5. In this paper any variable X related to
the message P‖S or its MD5 calculation, may have a
corresponding variable X ′ related to the message P ′‖S′
or its MD5 calculation. Furthermore, for such a ‘matched’
variable X ∈ Z/232Z we define δX = X ′ −X and ∆X =
(X ′[i]−X[i])31i=0, which is a BSDR of δX. For a matched
variable Z that consist of tuples of 32-bit integers, say
Z = (z1, z2, . . .), we define δZ as (δz1, δz2, . . .).
2.3 Description of MD5
2.3.1 MD5 overview
MD5 follows the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction and works
as follows, cf. (Rivest, 1992):
1. Padding. Pad the message: first a ‘1’-bit, next the
least number of ‘0’ bits to make the bitlength equal
to 448 mod 512, and finally the bitlength of the
original unpadded message as a 64-bit little-endian
integer. As a result the total bitlength of the padded
message is 512N for a positive integer N .
2. Partitioning. Partition the padded message into N
consecutive 512-bit blocks M1, M2, . . . ,MN .
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3. Processing. To hash a message consisting of N
blocks, MD5 goes through N + 1 states IHVi, for
0 ≤ i ≤ N , called the intermediate hash values.
Each intermediate hash value IHVi consists of four
32-bit words ai, bi, ci, di. For i = 0 these are fixed
public values:
(a0, b0, c0, d0) = (6745230116, EFCDAB8916,
98BADCFE16, 1032547616).
For i = 1, 2, . . . , N intermediate hash value IHVi
is computed using the MD5 compression function
described in detail below:
IHVi = MD5Compress(IHVi−1,Mi).
4. Output. The resulting hash value is the last interme-
diate hash value IHVN , expressed as the concate-
nation of the hexadecimal byte strings of the four
words aN , bN , cN , dN , converted back from their
little-endian representation.
2.3.2 MD5 compression function
The input for the compression function
MD5Compress(IHV, B) consists of an intermediate hash
value IHV = (a, b, c, d) and a 512-bit message block B.
The compression function consists of 64 steps (numbered
0 to 63), split into four consecutive rounds of 16 steps
each. Each step t uses modular additions, a left rotation,
and a non-linear function ft, and involves an Addition
Constant ACt and a Rotation Constant RCt. These are
defined as follows (see also Appendix A):
ACt =
⌊
232 |sin(t+ 1)|⌋ , 0 ≤ t < 64,
(RCt, RCt+1, RCt+2, RCt+3)
=

(7, 12, 17, 22) for t = 0, 4, 8, 12,
(5, 9, 14, 20) for t = 16, 20, 24, 28,
(4, 11, 16, 23) for t = 32, 36, 40, 44,
(6, 10, 15, 21) for t = 48, 52, 56, 60.
The non-linear function ft depends on the round:
ft(x, y, z) =
F (x, y, z) = (x ∧ y)⊕ (x ∧ z) for 0 ≤ t < 16,
G(x, y, z) = (z ∧ x)⊕ (z ∧ y) for 16 ≤ t < 32,
H(x, y, z) = x⊕ y ⊕ z for 32 ≤ t < 48,
I(x, y, z) = y ⊕ (x ∨ z) for 48 ≤ t < 64.
(1)
The message block B is partitioned into sixteen consecu-
tive 32-bit wordsm0,m1, . . ., m15 (with little-endian byte
ordering), and expanded to 64 words Wt, for 0 ≤ t < 64,
of 32 bits each (see also Appendix A):
Wt =

mt for 0 ≤ t < 16,
m(1+5t) mod 16 for 16 ≤ t < 32,
m(5+3t) mod 16 for 32 ≤ t < 48,
m(7t) mod 16 for 48 ≤ t < 64.
We follow the description of the MD5 compression func-
tion from (Hawkes, Paddon, and Rose, 2004) because its
‘unrolling’ of the cyclic state facilitates the analysis. For
each step t the compression function algorithm maintains
a working register with 4 state words Qt, Qt−1, Qt−2
and Qt−3 and calculates a new state word Qt+1. With
(Q0, Q−1, Q−2, Q−3) = (b, c, d, a), for t = 0, 1, . . . , 63 in
succession Qt+1 is calculated as follows:
Ft = ft(Qt, Qt−1, Qt−2),
Tt = Ft +Qt−3 +ACt +Wt,
Rt = RL(Tt, RCt),
Qt+1 = Qt +Rt.
(2)
After all steps are computed, the resulting state words
are added to the intermediate hash value and returned
as output:
MD5Compress(IHV, B)
= (a+Q61, b+Q64, c+Q63, d+Q62). (3)
3 An overview of chosen-prefix collisions for
MD5
Given two arbitrary chosen messages, our purpose is to
find appendages such that the extended messages collide
under MD5. In this section we give a summary of our
method.
Given the two arbitrary messages, we first apply
padding to the shorter of the two, if any, to make their
lengths equal. This ensures that the Merkle-Damg˚ard
strengthening -- which is applied after the last bits of
the message and involves the message’s bitlength -- is
identical for the two messages resulting from this con-
struction. We impose the additional requirement that
both resulting messages are a specific number of bits
(such as 64 or 96) short of a whole number of blocks. In
principle this can be avoided, but it leads to an efficient
method that allows relatively easy presentation. All these
requirements can easily be met, also in applications with
stringent formatting restrictions.
Given this message pair, we modify a suggestion by
Xiaoyun Wang (private communication) by finding a
pair of k-bit values that, when appended to the last
incomplete message blocks, results in a specific form of
difference vector between the IHVs after application of
the MD5 compression function to the extended message
pair. Finding the k-bit appendages can be done using a
birthday search procedure.
The specific form of difference vector between the
IHVs that is aimed for during the birthday search is such
that the difference pattern can relatively easily be re-
moved compared to the more or less random difference
pattern one may expect given two arbitrarily chosen pre-
fixes. Removing the difference pattern is done by further
appending to the messages a sequence of near-collision
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Figure 2 Chosen-prefix collision overview
blocks. Each pair of near-collision blocks targets a spe-
cific subpattern of the remaining differences. For each
such subpattern we use an automated, improved version
of Wang and Yu’s original approach to construct a new
differential path, as described in detail in Section 4 below,
and subsequently use the differential path to construct a
pair of near-collision blocks. Appending those blocks to
the two messages results in a new difference vector be-
tween the new IHVs from which the targeted subpattern
has been eliminated compared to the previous difference
vector. The construction continues as long as differences
exist. The above process is depicted in Figure 2.
How the various steps involved in this construction are
carried out and how their parameters are tuned depends
on what needs to be optimized. Extensive birthday search-
ing can be used to create difference patterns that require a
small number of pairs of near-collision blocks. When com-
bined with a properly chosen large family of differential
paths, a single pair of near-collison blocks suffices to com-
plete the collision right away. However, it may make the
actual near-collision block construction quite challenging,
which leads to the intuitively expected result that find-
ing very short chosen-prefix collision-causing appendages
is relatively costly. On the other side of the spectrum,
fast birthday searching combined with a smaller family
of differential paths leads to the need for many successive
pairs of near-collision blocks, each of which can quickly
be found: if one is willing to accept long chosen-prefix
collision-causing appendages, the overall construction can
be done quite fast. Between the two extremes almost ev-
erything can be varied: number of near-collision blocks,
their construction time given the differential path, time
to find the full differential path, birthday search time and
space requirements, etc., leading to a very wide variety
of ‘optimal’ choices.
The next section contains the details of the various
steps in this process, and how the steps are best glued
together depending on the circumstances. Application
scenarios that impose different restrictions on the chosen-
prefix collisions are then presented in Section 5.
4 Chosen-prefix collision construction for
MD5, details
In Section 4.1 an outline of the chosen-prefix collision
construction is given; this includes a short description of
the birthday search referred to in Section 3, the further
details of which can be found in Section 4.2. Differential
paths are introduced in Section 4.3 and Sections 4.4.1
through 4.4.6 describe how to construct partial and full
differential paths. Collision finding --- the search for ac-
tual near-collision blocks that satisfy a given differential
path --- is treated in Section 4.5 and an optional differen-
tial path preprocessing step to improve collision finding
is presented in Section 4.5.3. Section 4.6 gives some de-
tails of our implementations and the complexity analysis
is treated in Section 4.7. Finally, we present a practical
chosen-prefix collision attack using a single near-collision
block in Section 4.8.
4.1 Outline of the collision construction
A chosen-prefix collision for MD5 is a pair of messages M
and M ′ that consist of arbitrarily chosen prefixes P and
P ′ (not necessarily of the same length), together with
constructed suffixes S and S′, such that M = P‖S, M ′ =
P ′‖S′, and MD5(M) = MD5(M ′). The suffixes consist of
three parts: padding bitstrings Sr, S
′
r, followed by ‘birth-
day’ bitstrings Sb, S
′
b both of bitlength 64 + k, where
0 ≤ k ≤ 32 is a parameter, followed by bitstrings Sc, S′c
each consisting of a sequence of near-collision blocks. The
padding bitstrings are chosen such that the bitlengths
of P‖Sr and P ′‖S′r are both equal to 512n− 64− k for
a positive integer n. The birthday bitstrings Sb, S
′
b are
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Table 4-1 Family of partial differential paths using δm11 = ±2p−10 mod 32, where s0, . . . , sw′ ∈ {−1, 0,+1} and
w′ = min(w, 31− p) for a fixed w ≥ 0. Interesting values for the parameter w are between 2 and 5.
t δQt δFt δWt δTt δRt RCt
31 ∓2p−10 mod 32
32 0
33 0
34 0 0 ±2p−10 mod 32 0 0 16
35− 60 0 0 0 0 0 ·
61 0 0 ±2p−10 mod 32 ±2p−10 mod 32 ±2p 10
62 ±2p 0 0 0 0 15
63 ±2p 0 0 0 0 21
64 ±2p
+
∑w′
λ=0 sλ2
p+21+λ mod 32
determined in such a way that application of the MD5
compression function to P‖Sr‖Sb and P ′‖S′r‖S′b results
in IHVn and IHV
′
n, respectively and in the notation from
Section 2.3.1, for which δIHVn has a certain desirable
property that is explained below.
The idea is to eliminate the difference δIHVn
in r consecutive steps, for some r, by writing Sc =
Sc,1‖Sc,2‖ . . . ‖Sc,r and S′c = S′c,1‖S′c,2‖ . . . ‖S′c,r for r
pairs of near-collision blocks (Sc,j , S
′
c,j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ r. For
each pair of near-collision blocks (Sc,j , S
′
c,j) we need to
construct a differential path (see Section 4.3 for an in-
formal definition of this term) such that the difference
vector δIHVn+j has lower weight than δIHVn+j−1, until
after r pairs we have reached δIHVn+r = (0, 0, 0, 0).
Fix some j and let Sc,j consist of 32-bit words mi, for
0 ≤ i < 16. We fix fifteen of the δmi as 0 and allow only
δm11 to be ±2p−10 mod 32 with as yet unspecified p with
0 ≤ p < 32 (note the slight abuse of notation, since we
define message block differences without specifying the
message blocks themselves). This was suggested by Xi-
aoyun Wang because with this type of message difference
the number of bitconditions over the final two and a half
rounds can be kept low, which turns out to be helpful
while constructing collisions. For steps t = 34 up to t = 61
the differential path is fully determined by δm11 as illus-
trated in Table 4-1. The greater variability for the steps
not specified in Table 4-1 does not need to be fixed at
this point. In the last two steps there is a greater degree
of freedom specified by the integer w ≥ 0 that determines
which and how many IHV differences can be eliminated
per pair of near-collision blocks. A larger w allows more
eliminations by means of additional differential paths.
The latter have, however, a smaller chance to be satisfied
because they depend on more (and thus less likely) carry
propagations in ∆Q62 and ∆Q63. This effect contributes
to the complexity of finding the near-collision blocks sat-
isfying the differential paths. Varying w therefore leads
to a trade-off between fewer near-collision blocks and
increased complexity to find them.
This entire construction of the pair of near-collision
blocks (Sc,j , S
′
c,j) will be done in a fully automated way
based on the choice of w and the values of IHVn+j−1 and
IHV′n+j−1 as specified. It follows from equation (3) and
the rows for t ≥ 61 in Table 4-1 that a differential path
with δm11 = ±2p−10 mod 32 would add a tuple
±
0, 2p + w′∑
λ=0
sλ2
p+21+λ mod 32, 2p, 2p

to δIHVn+j−1, with notation as in Table 4-1. This is set
forth in more detail below. A sequence of such tuples is
too restrictive to eliminate arbitrary δIHVn: although
differences in the b component can be handled using
a number of near-collision block pairs, only identical
differences can be removed from the c and d components
and the a-component differences are not affected at all.
We therefore make sure that δIHVn has the desirable
property, as referred to above, that it can be eliminated
using these tuples. This is done in the birthday search step
where birthday bitstrings Sb and S
′
b are determined such
that δIHVn = (0, δb, δc, δc) for some δb and δc. A δIHVn
of this form corresponds to a collision (a, c− d) = (a′, c′ −
d′) between IHVn = (a, b, c, d) and IHV′n = (a
′, b′, c′, d′).
With a search space of only 64 bits, such a collision can
easily be found. Since the number of near-collision block
pairs and the effort required to find them depends in part
on the number of bit differences between δb and δc, it
may pay off to lower that number at the cost of extending
the birthday search space. For instance, for any k with
0 ≤ k ≤ 32, a collision (a, c− d, c− b mod 2k) = (a′, c′ −
d′, c′ − b′ mod 2k) with a (64 + k)-bit search space results
in δc− δb ≡ 0 mod 2k and thus, on average, just (32−
k)/3 bit differences between δb and δc. Determining such
Sb and S
′
b can be expected to require on the order of√
2pi2 2
64+k =
√
pi232+(k/2) calls to the MD5 compression
function. More on the birthday search in Section 4.2.
In the conference version (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger,
2007) of this paper we used only the differential paths
with δQ64 = ±2p. This forced us to use the harder to sat-
isfy constraint δIHVn = (0, δc, δc, δc) with a search space
consisting of 96 bits and an expected birthda search cost
of
√
pi248 MD5 compression function calls, which is the
same as choosing k = 32 above. The top part of Figure 3
visualizes the corresponding construction of near-collision
blocks for our colliding certificate example from (Stevens,
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Figure 3 Above: δIHVs for the colliding certificates with
different Distinguished Names. Below: δIHVs for
the colliding website certificate and the rogue CA
certificate.
Lenstra, and de Weger, 2007). The horizontal lines rep-
resent the NAFs of δIHVi for i = 0, 1, . . . , 21. In this
example P‖Sr‖Sb consists of 4 blocks (i.e., n = 4), so
that three identical groups of bit differences are left at
i = 4. As shown in Figure 3 each of these groups consists
of 8 bits. The bits in each group of eight are eliminated
simultaneously with the corresponding bits in the other
groups of eight by 8 pairs of near-collision blocks, so that
at i = 12 a full collision is reached. The blocks after that
are identical for the two messages, so that the collision
is retained.
The lower part of Figure 3 visualizes the improved
construction as used for the example from Section 5.2. In
that example P‖Sr‖Sb consists of 8 blocks (i.e., n = 8)
and results in a difference vector δIHVn of the form
(0, δb, δc, δc). For any reasonable w, e.g., w = 2, we then
select a sequence of differential paths from the family
given in Table 4-1 to eliminate δIHVn. For this example,
3 pairs of near-collision blocks sufficed to reach a collision.
In the next paragraphs we show how this can be done
for general δIHVn of the form (0, δb, δc, δc).
Let, for any such difference vector, δc =
∑
i ki2
i and
δb− δc = ∑i li2i, where (ki)31i=0 and (li)31i=0 are NAFs. If
δc 6= 0, let i be such that ki 6= 0. Using a differential path
from Table 4-1 with δm11 = −ki2i−10 mod 32 we can elim-
inate the difference ki2
i in δc and δd and simultaneously
change δb by
ki2
i +
i+21+w′ mod 32∑
λ=i+21 mod 32
lλ2
λ,
where w′ = min(w, 31− i). Here one needs to be care-
ful that each non-zero lλ is eliminated only once in the
case when multiple i’s allow the elimination of lλ. Do-
ing this for all non-zero ki’s in the NAF of δc will result
in a difference vector (0, δbˆ, 0, 0) where δbˆ may be dif-
ferent from δb, and where the weight w(NAF(δbˆ)) may
be smaller or larger than w(NAF(δb)). More precisely,
δbˆ =
∑31
λ=0 eλlλ2
λ, where eλ = 0 if there exist indices i
and j with 0 ≤ j ≤ min(w, 31− i) such that ki = ±1 and
λ = 21 + i+ j mod 32 and eλ = 1 otherwise.
The bits in δbˆ can be eliminated as follows. Let
(lˆi)
31
i=0 = NAF(δbˆ) and let j be such that lˆj = ±1 and
j − 21 mod 32 is minimal. Then the difference ∑j+w′i=j lˆi2i
with w′ = min(w, 31− (j − 21 mod 32)) can be elimi-
nated from δbˆ using δm11 = 2
j−31 mod 32, which in-
troduces a new difference 2j−21 mod 32 in δb, δc and
δd. This latter difference is eliminated using δm11 =
−2j−31 mod 32, which then leads to a new difference vector
(0, δb, 0, 0) with w(NAF(δb)) < w(NAF(δbˆ)). The process
is repeated until all differences have been eliminated.
Algorithm 4-1 summarizes the construction of pairs
of near-collision blocks set forth above. The details of the
construction are described in the sections below.
4.2 Birthday search
A birthday search on a search space V is generally per-
formed as in (van Oorschot and Wiener, 1999) by iter-
ating a properly chosen deterministic function f : V →
V and by assuming that the points of V thus visited
form a ‘random walk’, also called a trail. After approxi-
mately
√
pi|V |/2 iterations one may expect to have en-
countered a collision, i.e., different points x and y such
that f(x) = f(y). As the entire trail can in practice not
be stored and to take advantage of parallelism, different
pseudo-random walks are generated, of which only the
startpoints, lengths, and endpoints are kept. The end-
points are ‘distinguished points’, points with an easily
recognizable bitpattern depending on |V |, available stor-
age and other characteristics. The average length of a
walk is inversely proportional to the fraction of distin-
guished points in V . Since intersecting walks share their
endpoints, they can easily be detected. The collision point
can then be recomputed given the startpoints and lengths
of the two colliding walks. The expected cost (i.e., num-
ber of evaluations of f) to generate the walks is denoted
by Ctr and the expected cost of the recomputation to
determine collision points is denoted by Ccoll.
In our case the search space V and iteration function
f depend on an integer parameter k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 32} as
explained in Section 4.1. The birthday collision that we
try to find, however, needs to satisfy several additional
conditions that cannot be captured by V , f , or k: the
prefixes associated with x and y in a birthday collision
f(x) = f(y) must be different, and the required number
of pairs of near-collision blocks may be at most r when
allowing differential paths with parameter w. The proba-
bility that a collision satisfies all requirements depends
not only on the choice of r and w, but also on the value
for k, and is denoted by pr,k,w. As a consequence, on
average 1/pr,k,w birthday collisions have to be found.
Assuming that M bytes of memory are available and
that a single trail requires 28 bytes of storage (namely
96 bits for the start- and endpoint each, and 32 for the
length), this leads to the following expressions for the
birthday search costs:
Ctr(r, k, w) =
√
pi · |V |
2pr,k,w
,
Ccoll(r, k, w,M) =
2.5 · 28 · Ctr(r, k, w)
pr,k,w ·M ,
where |V | = 264+k, and the factor 2.5 is explained in
Section 3 of (van Oorschot and Wiener, 1999).
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Algorithm 4-1 Construction of pairs of near-collision blocks.
Given n-block P‖Sr‖Sb and P ′‖S′r‖S′b, the corresponding resulting IHVn and IHV′n, and a value for w, a pair
of bitstrings Sc, S
′
c is constructed consisting of sequences of near-collision blocks such that M = P‖Sr‖Sb‖Sc and
M ′ = P ′‖S′r‖S′b‖S′c satisfy MD5(M) = MD5(M ′). This is done by performing in succession steps 1, 2 and 3 below.
1. Let j = 0 and let Sc and S
′
c be two bitstrings of length zero.
2. Let δIHVn+j = (0, δb, δc, δc). If δc = 0 then proceed to step 3. Let (ki)
31
i=0 = NAF(δc) and (li)
31
i=0 = NAF(δb− δc).
Choose any i for which ki 6= 0 and let w′ = min(w, 31− i). Perform steps (a) through (f):
(a) Increase j by 1.
(b) Let δSc,j = (δm0, δm1, . . . , δm15) with δm11 = −ki2i−10 mod 32 and δmt = 0 for 0 ≤ t < 16 and t 6= 11.
(c) Given δIHVn+j−1 = IHV′n+j−1 − IHVn+j−1 and δSc,j , construct a few differential paths based on Table 4-1
with
δQ61 = 0, δQ64 = −ki2i −
i+21+w′ mod 32∑
λ=i+21 mod 32
lλ2
λ, δQ63 = δQ62 = −ki2i.
How this is done is described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
(d) Find message blocks Sc,j and S
′
c,j = Sc,j + δSc,j that satisfy one of the constructed differential paths. How
this is done is described in Section 4.5. If proper message blocks cannot be found, back up to step (c) to
find more differential paths.
(e) Compute IHVn+j = MD5Compress(IHVn+j−1, Sc,j),
IHV′n+j = MD5Compress(IHV
′
n+j−1, S
′
c,j), and append Sc,j and S
′
c,j to Sc and S
′
c, respectively.
(f) Repeat step 2
3. Let δIHVn+j = (0, δbˆ, 0, 0). If δbˆ = 0 then terminate. Let (li)
31
i=0 = NAF(δbˆ). Choose i such that li 6= 0 and
i− 21 mod 32 is minimal and let w′ = min(w, 31− (i− 21 mod 32)). Perform steps (a) through (e) as above
with δm11 = 2
i−31 mod 32 as opposed to δm11 = −ki2i−10 mod 32 in step (b) and in steps (c) and (d) with
δQ61 = 0, δQ64 = 2
i−21 mod 32 −
i+w′ mod 32∑
λ=i
lλ2
λ, δQ63 = δQ62 = 2
i−21 mod 32.
Perform steps (a) through (e) again with δm11 = −2i−31 mod 32 in step (b) and
δQ61 = 0, δQ64 = δQ63 = δQ62 = −2i−21 mod 32
in steps (c) and (d). Repeat step 3.
For M = 70/pr,k,w as given in the last column of Ta-
ble 4-2 and in the more extensive tables in Appendix C,
the two costs are equal, and the overall expected birth-
day costs becomes 2Ctr(r, k, w). However, if the cost at
run time of finding the trails exceeds the expected cost by
a factor λ, then the cost to determine the resulting birth-
day collisions can be expected to increase by a factor λ2.
Hence, in practice it is advisable to chooseM considerably
larger. For  ≤ 1, using M = 70/(pr,k,w · ) bytes of mem-
ory will result in Ccoll ≈  · Ctr and the expected overall
birthday search cost will be about (1 + ) · Ctr(r, k, w)
MD5 compressions.
4.3 Differential paths and bitconditions
In step (e) of Algorithm 4-1, MD5Compress is applied to
the respective intermediate hash values IHV and IHV′
and message blocks B and B′. Here, IHV and IHV′ were
constructed in such a way that δIHV has a specific struc-
ture, as set forth above. Furthermore, the blocks B and
B′ were constructed such that δB has a pre-specified low-
weight value (cf. step (b) of Algorithm 4-1) and such that
throughout the 64 steps of both calls to MD5Compress
the propagation of differences between corresponding
variables follows a specific precise description, as deter-
mined in step (c) of Algorithm 4-1. In this section we
describe how this description, which is called a differen-
tial path for MD5Compress, is determined based on IHV,
IHV′ and δB. According to equations (2),
δFt = ft(Q
′
t, Q
′
t−1, Q
′
t−2)− ft(Qt, Qt−1, Qt−2),
δTt = δFt + δQt−3 + δWt,
δRt = RL(T
′
t , RCt)−RL(Tt, RCt), and
δQt+1 = δQt + δRt.
(4)
Copyright c© 2009 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Int. J. of Applied Cryptography, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2012 332
Table 4-2 Expected birthday costs for k = 0. The columns p, Ctr and M denote the values of − log2(pr,k,w),
log2(Ctr(r, k, w)) and the minimum required memory M such that Ccoll(r, k, w,M) ≤ Ctr(r, k, w), respectively. The
values for pr,k,w were estimated from Algorithm 4-1. See Appendix C for more extensive tables.
k = 0 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
r p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
16 5.9 35.27 1MB 1.75 33.2 1MB 1.01 32.83 1MB 1. 32.83 1MB
15 7.2 35.92 1MB 2.39 33.52 1MB 1.06 32.86 1MB 1. 32.83 1MB
14 8.71 36.68 1MB 3.37 34.01 1MB 1.27 32.96 1MB 1.04 32.84 1MB
13 10.45 37.55 1MB 4.73 34.69 1MB 1.78 33.22 1MB 1.2 32.93 1MB
12 12.45 38.55 1MB 6.53 35.59 1MB 2.78 33.71 1MB 1.66 33.16 1MB
11 14.72 39.68 2MB 8.77 36.71 1MB 4.34 34.5 1MB 2.61 33.63 1MB
10 17.28 40.97 11MB 11.47 38.06 1MB 6.54 35.6 1MB 4.18 34.42 1MB
9 20.16 42.4 79MB 14.62 39.64 2MB 9.38 37.02 1MB 6.46 35.56 1MB
8 23.39 44.02 732MB 18.21 41.43 21MB 12.88 38.76 1MB 9.52 37.09 1MB
7 26.82 45.73 8GB 22.2 43.43 323MB 17.02 40.83 9MB 13.4 39.02 1MB
6 31.2 47.92 161GB 26.73 45.69 8GB 21.78 43.22 241MB 18.14 41.4 20MB
5 35. 49.83 3TB 31.2 47.92 161GB 27.13 45.89 10GB 23.74 44.2 938MB
4 34. 49.33 2TB 30.19 47.42 81GB
It follows that neither δFt nor δRt is uniquely determined
given the input differences (δQt, δQt−1, δQt−2) and δTt,
respectively. Therefore a more flexible tool is required to
describe in a succinct way a valid propagation of differ-
ences, starting from IHV = (Q−3, Q0, Q−1, Q−2), IHV′ =
(Q′−3, Q
′
0, Q
′
−1, Q
′
−2) and δB and, in our case, resulting
in the desired final differences (δQ61, δQ62, δQ63, δQ64)
as defined in Table 4-1 and as targeted by step (c) of
Algorithm 4-1.
4.3.1 Bitconditions
Differential paths are described using bitconditions qt =
(qt[i])
31
i=0 on (Qt, Q
′
t), where each bitcondition qt[i] spec-
ifies a restriction on the bits Qt[i] and Q
′
t[i] possibly
including values of other bits Ql[i]. As we will show in
this section, we can specify the values of δQt, δFt for all
t using bitconditions on (Qt, Q
′
t), which also determine
δTt and δRt = δQt+1 − δQt according to the difference
equations (4). Thus, a differential path can be seen as a
68× 32 matrix (qt)64t=−3 of bitconditions. In general, the
first four rows (qt)
0
t=−3 are fully determined by the val-
ues of IHV and IHV′. Furthermore, in our specific case
where δB consists of just δm11 = ±2d, the final 34 rows
(qt)
64
t=31 correspond to Table 4-1 and one of the choices
made in step (c) of Algorithm 4-1.
Table 4-3 Differential bitconditions.
δQt =
∑31
i=0 2
iki and ∆Qt = (ki).
qt[i] condition on (Qt[i], Q
′
t[i]) ki
. Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] 0
+ Qt[i] = 0, Q
′
t[i] = 1 +1
- Qt[i] = 1, Q
′
t[i] = 0 −1
Bitconditions are denoted using symbols such as
0, 1, +, -, ^, . . ., as defined in Tables 4-3 and 4-4, to facil-
itate the representation of a differential path. A direct
bitcondition qt[i] does not involve any other indices than
t and i, whereas an indirect bitcondition involves one
of the row indices t± 1 or t± 2 as well. Table 4-3 lists
differential bitconditions qt[i], which are direct bitcondi-
tions that specify the value ki = Q
′
t[i]−Qt[i]. A full row
of differential bitconditions qt = (ki)
31
i=0 fixes a BSDR of
δQt =
∑31
i=0 2
iki. Table 4-4 lists boolean function bitcon-
ditions, which are direct or indirect. They are used to
resolve a possible ambiguity in
∆Ft[[i]]
= ft(Q
′
t[i], Q
′
t−1[i], Q
′
t−2[i])
−ft(Qt[i], Qt−1[i], Qt−2[i]) ∈ {−1, 0,+1}
that may be caused by different possible values for
Qj [i], Q
′
j [i] given differential bitconditions qj [i]. As an ex-
ample, for t = 0 and (qt[i], qt−1[i], qt−2[i]) = (., +, -) (cf.
Table 4-3) there is an ambiguity:
if Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = 0 then ft(0, 1, 0)− ft(0, 0, 1) = −1,
if Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = 1 then ft(1, 1, 0)− ft(1, 0, 1) = +1.
To resolve this ambiguity the triple of bitconditions
(.,+,-) can be replaced by (0,+,-) or (1,+,-) for the two
cases given above, respectively.
All boolean function bitconditions include the constant
bitcondition Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i], so boolean function bitcondi-
tions do not affect δQt. Furthermore, the indirect boolean
function bitconditions never involve bitconditions + or -,
since those bitconditions can always be replaced by one
of the direct ones ., 0 or 1. For the indirect bitconditions
we distinguish between ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ ones,
because that makes it easier to resolve an ambiguity later
on in our step-wise approach. In a valid (partial) differ-
ential path one can easily convert forward bitconditions
into backward bitconditions and vice versa.
When all δQt and δFt have been determined by bit-
conditions then also δTt and δRt = δQt+1 − δQt can be
determined, which together describe the bitwise rota-
tion of δTt in each step. This does, however, not imply
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Table 4-4 Boolean function bitconditions
qt[i] condition on (Qt[i], Q
′
t[i]) direct/indirect direction
0 Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = 0 direct
1 Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = 1 direct
^ Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt−1[i] indirect backward
v Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt+1[i] indirect forward
! Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt−1[i] indirect backward
y Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt+1[i] indirect forward
m Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt−2[i] indirect backward
w Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt+2[i] indirect forward
# Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt−2[i] indirect backward
h Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] = Qt+2[i] indirect forward
? Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] ∧ (Qt[i] = 1 ∨Qt−2[i] = 0) indirect backward
q Qt[i] = Q
′
t[i] ∧ (Qt+2[i] = 1 ∨Qt[i] = 0) indirect forward
that the left rotate of δTt over RCt positions is equal
to δRt or with what probability that happens. See also
Section 4.4.4.
The differential paths we constructed for several of
our examples can be found at http://www.win.tue.nl/
hashclash/ChosenPrefixCollisions/.
4.4 Differential path construction
The basic idea to construct a differential path is to con-
struct a partial lower differential path over steps t =
0, 1, . . . , 11 and a partial upper differential path over
steps t = 63, 62, . . . , 16, so that the Qi involved in the
partial paths meet but do not overlap. Given the two
partial paths, we try to connect them over the remaining
4 steps into one full differential path which hopefully suc-
ceeds with some non-negligible probability. Using many
lower and upper differential paths and trying to connect
each combination of a lower and an upper differential
path will eventually result in full differential paths. Con-
structing the partial lower path can be done by starting
with bitconditions q−3, q−2, q−1, q0 that are equivalent
to the values of IHV, IHV′ and then extend this step by
step. Similarly the partial upper path can be constructed
by extending the partial paths in Table 4-1 step by step.
In both constructions the transitions between the steps
must be compatible with the targeted message differ-
ence δB. To summarize, step (c) of Algorithm 4-1 in
Section 4.1 consists of the following substeps:
c.1 Given IHV and IHV′, determine the corresponding
bitconditions (qi)
0
i=−3.
c.2 Generate partial lower differential paths by extend-
ing (qi)
0
i=−3 forward up to step t = 11. This is
explained in Sections 4.4.1 - 4.4.4.
c.3 Generate partial upper differential paths by ex-
tending the path specified by Table 4-1 backward
from t = 31 down to t = 16. This is explained in
Section 4.4.5.
c.4 Try to connect all pairs of lower and upper differ-
ential paths over t = 12, 13, 14, 15 to generate as
many full differential paths as possible given the
outcome of the two previous steps. This is explained
in Section 4.4.6.
4.4.1 Extending differential paths forward
In general, when constructing a differential path one must
first fix the message block differences δm0, . . . , δm15. In
our particular case this is achieved by the choice of δSc,j
in step (b) of Algorithm 4-1. Suppose we have a partial
differential path consisting of at least bitconditions qt−1
and qt−2 and that the differences δQt and δQt−3 are
known. In step c.2 of Algorithm 4-1, we want to extend
this partial differential path forward with step t resulting
in the difference δQt+1, bitconditions qt, and additional
bitconditions qt−1, qt−2 (cf. Section 4.4).
We assume that all indirect bitconditions in qt−1 and
qt−2 are forward and involve only bits of Qt−1. If we
already have qt as opposed to just the value δQt (e.g. q0
resulting from given values IHV, IHV′), then we can skip
Section 4.4.2 and continue at Section 4.4.3.
4.4.2 Carry propagation
First we select bitconditions qt based on the value δQt.
Since we want to construct differential paths with as few
bitconditions as possible, but also want to be able to
randomize the process, any low weight BSDR (such as
the NAF) of δQt may be chosen, which then translates
into a possible choice for qt as in Table 4-3. For instance,
with δQt = 2
8, we may choose qt[8] = ‘+’, or qt[8] = ‘-’
and qt[9] = ‘+’ (with in either case all other qt[i] = ‘.’).
4.4.3 Boolean function
For some i, let (a, b, c) = (qt[i], qt−1[i], qt−2[i]) be
any triple of bitconditions such that all indi-
rect bitconditions involve only Qt[i], Qt−1[i] or
Qt−2[i]. For any such triple (a, b, c) let Uabc de-
note the set of tuples of values (x, x′, y, y′, z, z′) =
(Qt[i], Q
′
t[i], Qt−1[i], Q
′
t−1[i], Qt−2[i], Q
′
t−2[i]) satisfying
it:
Uabc =
{
(x, x′, y, y′, z, z′) ∈ {0, 1}6
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satisfies bitconditions (a, b, c)
}
.
The cardinality of Uabc indicates the amount of freedom
left by (a, b, c). Triples (a, b, c) for which Uabc = ∅ cannot
be part of a valid differential path and are thus of no
interest. The set of all triples (a, b, c) as above and with
Uabc 6= ∅ is denoted by Ft.
Each (a, b, c) ∈ Ft induces a set Vabc of possi-
ble boolean function differences ∆Ft[[i]] = ft(x
′, y′, z′)−
ft(x, y, z):
Vabc
= {ft(x′, y′, z′)− ft(x, y, z) | (x, x′, y, y′, z, z′) ∈ Uabc}
⊂ {−1, 0,+1}.
A triple (d, e, f) ∈ Ft with |Vdef | = 1 leaves no ambiguity
in ∆Ft[[i]] and is therefore called a solution. Let St ⊂ Ft
be the set of solutions.
For arbitrary (a, b, c) ∈ Ft and for each g ∈ Vabc, we
define Wabc,g as the subset of St consisting of all solutions
that are compatible with (a, b, c) and that have g as
boolean function difference:
Wabc,g = {(d, e, f) ∈ St | Udef ⊂ Uabc ∧ Vdef = {g}} .
For each g ∈ Vabc there is always a triple (d, e, f) ∈
Wabc,g consisting of direct bitconditions 01+- that suf-
fices, i.e., fixes a certain tuple in Uabc. This implies that
Wabc,g 6= ∅. Despite this fact, we are specifically inter-
ested in bitconditions (d, e, f) ∈Wabc,g that maximize
|Udef | as such bitconditions maximize the amount of free-
dom in the bits of Qt, Qt−1, Qt−2 while fully determining
∆Ft[[i]].
The direct and forward (resp. backward) boolean
function bitconditions were chosen such that for all t, i
and (a, b, c) ∈ Ft and for all g ∈ Vabc there exists a triple
(d, e, f) ∈Wabc,g consisting only of direct and forward
(resp. backward) bitconditions such that{
(x, x′, y, y′, z, z′) ∈ Uabc∣∣ ft(x′, y′, z′)− ft(x, y, z) = g} = Udef .
These boolean function bitconditions allow one to resolve
an ambiguity in an optimal way in the sense that they
are sufficient and necessary.
If the triple (d, e, f) is not unique, then for simplicity
we prefer direct over indirect bitconditions and short indi-
rect bitconditions (vy^!) over long indirect ones (whqm#?).
For given t, bitconditions (a, b, c), and g ∈ Vabc we define
FC(t, abc, g) = (d, e, f) as the preferred triple (d, e, f)
consisting of direct and forward bitconditions. Similarly,
we define BC(t, abc, g) as the preferred triple consisting
of direct and backward bitconditions. These functions are
easily determined and should be precomputed. They have
been tabulated in Appendix B in Tables B-1, B-2, B-3 and
B-4 grouped according to the four different round func-
tions F,G,H, I, and per table for all 27 possible triples
(a, b, c) of differential bitconditions.
To determine the differences δFt =
∑31
i=0 2
igi we pro-
ceed as follows. For i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 31 we assume that we
have valid bitconditions (a, b, c) = (qt[i], qt−1[i], qt−2[i])
where only c may be indirect. If it is, it must involve
Qt−1[i]. Therefore (a, b, c) ∈ Ft. If |Vabc| = 1, then there
is no ambiguity and {gi} = Vabc. Otherwise, if |Vabc| >
1, then we choose gi arbitrarily from Vabc and we re-
solve the ambiguity by replacing bitconditions (a, b, c)
by FC(t, abc, gi). Once all gi and thus δFt have been
determined, δTt is determined as δFt + δQt−3 + δWt.
Note that in the next step t+ 1 our assumptions hold
again, since a is a direct bitcondition and if b is indirect
then it is forward and involves a. Bitconditions a and b
may be new compared to the previous step, namely if
the triple (a, b, c) was replaced by FC(t, abc, gi).
4.4.4 Bitwise rotation
The integer δTt as just determined does not uniquely
determine δRt = RL(T
′
t , n)−RL(Tt, n), where n = RCt
(cf. difference equations (4)). In this section we show
how to find the most likely δRt that corresponds to
a given δTt, i.e., the v for which |{X ∈ Z/232Z | v =
RL(X + δTt, n)−RL(X,n)}| is maximized
Any BSDR (k31, . . . , k32−n, k31−n, . . . , k0) of δTt gives
rise to a candidate δRt given by the BSDR RL((ki), n) =
(k31−n, . . . , k0, k31, . . . , k32−n). Two BSDRs (ki) and (li)
of δTt result in the same δRt if
31−n∑
i=0
2iki =
31−n∑
i=0
2ili and
31∑
i=32−n
2iki =
31∑
i=32−n
2ili.
This suggests the following approach. We define a par-
tition as a pair (α, β) of integers such that α+ β =
δTt mod 2
32, |α| < 232−n, |β| < 232 and 232−n|β. For any
partition (α, β), values ki ∈ {0,±1} for 0 ≤ i < 32 can
be found such that
α =
31−n∑
i=0
2iki and β =
31∑
i=32−n
2iki. (5)
With α+ β = δTt mod 2
32 it follows that (ki) is a BSDR
of δTt. Conversely, with (5) any BSDR (ki) of δTt defines
a partition, which we denote (ki) ≡ (α, β).
The rotation of a partition (α, β) is defined as
RL((α, β), n) = (2nα+ 2n−32β mod 232).
If (ki) ≡ (α, β), this matches RL((ki), n). The latter, as
seen above, is a candidate δRt, and we find that different
partitions give rise to different δRt candidates. Thus, to
find the most likely δRt, we define
p(α,β) = Pr[RL((α, β), n) = RL(X + δTt, n)−RL(X,n)]
where X ranges over the 32-bit words, and show how
p(α,β) can be calculated.
Let x = δTt mod 2
32−n and y = (δTt − x) mod 232
with 0 ≤ x < 232−n and 0 ≤ y < 232. This gives rise to
at most 4 partitions:
• (α, β) = (x, y);
• (α, β) = (x, y − 232), if y 6= 0;
• (α, β) = (x− 232−n, y + 232−n mod 232), if x 6= 0;
• (α, β) = (x− 232−n, (y + 232−n mod 232)− 232),
if x 6= 0 ∧ y + 232−n 6= 232.
Copyright c© 2009 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Int. J. of Applied Cryptography, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2012 335
These are all possible partitions, so we find that δTt
leads to at most 4 different possibilities for δRt. It re-
mains to determine p(α,β) for the above partitions. For
each of the 4 possibilities this is done by counting the
number of 32-bit words X such that the BSDR defined
by ki = (X + δTt)[i]−X[i] satisfies (ki) ≡ (α, β). Con-
sidering the (32− n) low-order bits, the probability that
a given α satisfies α =
∑31−n
i=0 ki follows from the num-
ber r of Y ’s with 0 ≤ Y < 232−n such that 0 ≤ α+ Y <
232−n: if α < 0 then r = 232−n + α and if α ≥ 0 then
r = 232−n − α. Hence r = 232−n − |α| out of 232−n Y’s.
Now assuming α =
∑31−n
i=0 ki, there is no carry to the
high-order bits and the same argument can be used for
β/232−n. Hence, we conclude
p(α,β) =
232−n − |α|
232−n
· 2
n − |β|2n−32
2n
.
Note that these probabilities, corresponding to the at
most 4 partitions above, indeed add up to 1. An equiva-
lent result was previously stated in Magnus Daum’s PhD
thesis (Daum, 2005, Section 4.1.3), although we provide
a new derivation.
In conclusion, all δRt that are compatible with a
given δTt can easily be determined, including the prob-
abilities that they occur. In Algorithm 4-1 we choose
a partition (α, β) for which p(α,β) is maximal and take
δRt = RL((α, β), n). A more straightforward approach
(as previously used in practice) would be to use δRt =
RL(NAF(δTt), n). This is in many cases the most likely
choice, and matches our desire to minimize the number
of differences in δQt and therefore also in δTt and δRt.
Given δRt, we finally determine δQt+1 as δQt + δRt.
4.4.5 Extending differential paths backward
Having dealt with the forward extension of step c.2 of Al-
gorithm 4-1 in Sections 4.4.2, 4.4.3 and 4.4.4, we now con-
sider the backward extension of step c.3 of Algorithm 4-1
(cf. Section 4.4). The backward construction follows the
same approach as the forward one. Our description relies
on the notation introduced in Section 4.4.3.
Suppose we have a partial differential path consist-
ing of at least bitconditions qt and qt−1 and that the
differences δQt+1 and δQt−2 are known. In step c.3 of
Algorithm 4-1 we want to extend this partial differen-
tial path backward with step t resulting in the difference
δQt−3, bitconditions qt−2, and additional bitconditions
qt, qt−1. We assume that all indirect bitconditions in qt
and qt−1 are backward and only involve bits of Qt−1.
We choose a low weight BSDR (such as the NAF) of
δQt−2, which then translates into a possible choice for
qt−2 as in Table 4-3.
As in the last two paragraphs of Section 4.4.3, the dif-
ferences δFt =
∑31
i=0 2
igi are determined by assuming for
i = 0, 1, . . . , 31 that we have valid bitconditions (a, b, c) =
(qt[i], qt−1[i], qt−2[i]) where only a may be indirect. If
it is, it must involve Qt−1[i]. Therefore (a, b, c) ∈ Ft. If
|Vabc| = 1, then there is no ambiguity and {gi} = Vabc.
Otherwise, if |Vabc| > 1, then we choose gi arbitrarily
from Vabc and we resolve the ambiguity by replacing
bitconditions (a, b, c) by BC(t, abc, gi).
To rotate δRt = δQt+1 − δQt over n = 32−RCt bits,
we may follow the framework as set forth in Section 4.4.4
with the roles of δRt and δTt reversed: choose a partition
(α, β) (of δRt as opposed to δTt) with maximal prob-
ability and determine δTt = RL((α, β), n). Finally, we
determine δQt−3 = δTt − δFt − δWt to extend our par-
tial differential path backward with step t. Note that
here also (i.e., as in the last paragraph of Section 4.4.3)
in the next step t− 1 our assumptions hold again, since c
is a direct bitcondition and if b is indirect then it is back-
ward and involves c (where b and c are new if (a, b, c)
was replaced by BC(t, abc, gi)).
4.4.6 Constructing full differential paths
Construction of a full differential path can be done as
follows. Assume that for some δQ−3 and bitconditions
q−2, q−1, q0 the forward construction as described in
Sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, and 4.4.4 has been carried
out up to step t = 11 (cf. step c.2 in Section 4.4). Fur-
thermore, assume that for some δQ64 and bitconditions
q63, q62, q61 the backward construction as described in
Section 4.4.5 has been carried out down to step t = 16 (cf.
step c.3 in Section 4.4). For each combination of forward
and backward partial differential paths thus found, this
leads to bitconditions q−2, q−1, . . . , q11, q14, q15, . . . , q63
and differences δQ−3, δQ12, δQ13, δQ64.
It remains to try and glue together each of these
combinations by finishing steps t = 12, 13, 14, 15 (cf. step
c.4 in Section 4.4) until a full differential path is found.
First, as in the backward extension in Section 4.4.5, for
t = 12, 13, 14, 15 we set δRt = δQt+1 − δQt, choose the
resulting δTt by left-rotating δRt over n−RCt bits, and
determine δFt = δTt − δWt − δQt−3.
We aim to complete the differential path by finding
new bitconditions q10, q11, . . ., q15 that are compatible
with the original bitconditions and that result in the
required δQ12, δQ13, δF12, δF13, δF14, δF15.
An efficient way to find the missing bitconditions is to
first test if they exist, and if so to backtrack to actually
construct them. For i = 0, 1, . . . , 32 we attempt to con-
struct a set Ui consisting of all tuples (q1, q2, f1, f2, f3, f4)
of 32-bit integers with qj ≡ fk ≡ 0 mod 2i for j = 1, 2 and
k = 1, 2, 3, 4 such that for all ` = 0, 1, . . . , i− 1 there ex-
ist compatible bitconditions q10[`], q11[`], . . . , q15[`] that
determine ∆Q11+j [[`]] and ∆F11+k[[`]] below, and such
that
δQ11+j = qj +
i−1∑
`=0
2`∆Q11+j [[`]], j = 1, 2,
δF11+k = fk +
i−1∑
`=0
2`∆F11+k[[`]], k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
(6)
From these conditions it follows that U0 must be cho-
sen as {(δQ12, δQ13, δF12, δF13, δF14, δF15)}. For i =
Copyright c© 2009 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Int. J. of Applied Cryptography, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2012 336
Algorithm 4-2 Construction of Ui+1 from Ui.
Suppose Ui is given as {(δQ12, δQ13, δF12, δF13, δF14, δF15)} if i = 0 or if i > 0 constructed inductively based on Ui−1
by means of this algorithm. For each tuple (q1, q2, f1, f2, f3, f4) ∈ Ui do the following:
1. Let Ui+1 = ∅ and (a, b, e, f) = (q15[i], q14[i], q11[i], q10[i])
2. For each bitcondition d = q12[i] ∈
{{.} if q1[i] = 0
{-, +} if q1[i] = 1 do
3. Let q′1 = 0,−1 or +1 depending on whether d = ‘.’, ‘-’ or ‘+’, respectively
4. For each different f ′1 ∈ {−f1[i],+f1[i]} ∩ Vdef do
5. Let (d′, e′, f ′) = FC(12, def, f ′1)
6. For each bitcondition c = q13[i] ∈
{{.} if q2[i] = 0
{-, +} if q2[i] = 1 do
7. Let q′2 = 0,−1 or +1 depending on whether c = ‘.’, ‘-’ or ‘+’, respectively
8. For each different f ′2 ∈ {−f2[i],+f2[i]} ∩ Vcd′e′ do
9. Let (c′, d′′, e′′) = FC(13, cd′e′, f ′2)
10. For each different f ′3 ∈ {−f3[i],+f3[i]} ∩ Vbc′d′′ do
11. Let (b′, c′′, d′′′) = FC(14, bc′d′′, f ′3)
12. For each different f ′4 ∈ {−f4[i],+f4[i]} ∩ Vab′c′′ do
13. Let (a′, b′′, c′′′) = FC(15, ab′c′′, f ′4)
14. If (q1 − 2iq′1, q2 − 2iq′2, f1 − 2if ′1, f2 − 2if ′2, f3 − 2if ′3, f4 − 2if ′4)
is not in Ui+1 yet, insert it in Ui+1
1, 2, . . . , 32, we attempt to construct Ui based on Ui−1
using Algorithm 4-2. Per j there are at most two qj ’s
and per k there are at most two fk’s that can satisfy the
above relations. Thsi implies that |Ui| ≤ 26 for each i,
0 ≤ i ≤ 32. On the other hand, for each tuple in Ui there
may in principle be many different compatible sets of
bitconditions.
As soon as we encounter an i for which Ui = ∅, we
know that the desired bitconditions do not exist, and that
we should try another combination of forward and back-
ward partial differential paths. If, however, we find U32 6=
∅ then it must be the case that U32 = {(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)}.
Furthermore, in that case, every set of bitconditions that
leads to this non-empty U32 gives rise to a full differen-
tial path, since equations (6) hold with i = 32. Thus, if
U32 6= ∅, there exists at least one valid path u0, u1, . . . , u32
with ui ∈ Ui. For each valid path, the desired new bitcon-
ditions (q15[i], q14[i], . . . , q10[i]) are (a
′, b′′, c′′′, d′′′, e′′, f ′),
which can be found at step 13 of Algorithm 4-2.
4.5 Collision finding
Collision finding is the process of finding an actual mes-
sage block pair Sc,j , S
′
c,j that satisfies a given δSc,j and a
differential path based on a given IHVn+j−1, IHV′n+j−1,
cf. step (d) of Algorithm 4-1. The differential paths as
originally considered by Wang et al. (Wang and Yu, 2005)
consisted of only 28 bitconditions. In that case, collision
finding can now be done in the equivalent of a mere 224.8
expected MD5 compression function calls, for arbitrary
IHV (Stevens, 2007). For chosen-prefix collisions, how-
ever, the number of bitconditions is substantially larger,
thereby complicating collision finding. For instance, in
one of our earliest chosen-prefix collision constructions
the differential path has 71 bitconditions on Q20 up to
Q63.
4.5.1 Tunnels
To find collisions for these more difficult differential
paths, we make extensive use of so-called tunnels (Klima,
2006). A tunnel allows one to make small changes in a
certain first round Qt, in specific bits of Qt that are de-
termined by the full differential path q−3, q−2, . . . , q64
under consideration, while causing changes in the second
round only after some step l that depends on the tunnel.
However, each tunnel implies that additional first-round
bitconditions have to be taken into account in the differ-
ential path, while leaving freedom of choice for some of
the bits in Qt that may be changed. A tunnel’s strength
is the number of independent bits that can be changed
in this first round Qt. Thus, a tunnel of strength k al-
lows us to generate 2k different message blocks that all
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Table 4-5 Collision finding tunnels for MD5.
Tunnel Change Affected Extra bitconditions?
T1 Q4[b] m3..m5,m7, Q21..Q64 Q5[b] = 1, Q6[b] = 1
T2 Q5[b] m4,m5,m7,m8, Q21..Q64 Q6[b] = 0
T3 Q14[b] m13..m15,m6, Q3,m2..m5, Q21..Q64 Q15[b] = Q16[b], Q3[b] free†
T4 Q9[b] m8..m10,m12, Q22..Q64 Q10[b] = 1, Q11[b] = 1
T5 Q10[b] m9,m10,m12,m13, Q22..Q64 Q11[b] = 0
T6 Q8[b] m7..m9, Q12,m12..m15, Q23..Q64 Q10[b] = 1, RR(Q12, 22)[b] free‡
T7 Q4[b] m3,m4,m7, Q24..Q64 Q5[b] = 0, Q6[b] = 1
T8 Q9[b] m8,m9,m12, Q25..Q64 Q10[b] = 0, Q11[b] = 1
? The extra bitconditions refer only to Qt[b] and not to Q′t[b], so e.g. Q6[b] = 0 is met by both q6[b] = ‘0’ and q6[b] = ‘+’.† Bitcondition q3[b] = ‘.’ and no other indirect bitconditions may involve Q3[b]. Set Q3[b] = Q14[b] to avoid carries in Q3.
‡ Bitcondition q12[b− 22 mod 32] = ‘.’ and no other indirect bitconditions may involve Q12[b− 22 mod 32]. Set Q12[b− 22 mod 32] = Q8[b]
to avoid carries in Q12.
satisfy the differential path up to and including step l in
the second round.
The tunnels used in our collision finding algorithm
are shown in Table 4-5. For example, the first tunnel
(T1) allows changes in bits of Q4, in such a way that if
Q4[b] is changed for some bit position b with 0 ≤ b < 32,
this causes extra bitconditions Q5[b] = 1 and Q6[b] = 1,
which have to be incorporated in the differential path.
Furthermore, because tunnel T1 affects after the first
round only Q21 through Q64 we have that l = 20, and T1
can be used to change message blocks m3,m4,m5, and
m7. To determine the strength of a tunnel one first needs
to incorporate the tunnel’s extra bitconditions in the full
differential path, and then count the remaining amount
of freedom in the first round Qt that is changed by the
tunnel. Given its dependence on the differential path, a
tunnel’s strength can thus not be tabulated.
The most effective tunnel is T8. As indicated in the
table, it affects after the first round only Q25, . . . , Q64.
Over these rounds, Wang and Yu’s original differential
paths have 20 bitconditions whereas the chosen-prefix col-
lision differential paths that we manage to construct have
approximately 27 bitconditions. It follows that, given
enough tunnel strength, especially for T7 and T8, collision
finding can be done efficiently.
4.5.2 Algorithm
In our construction we performed the collision finding us-
ing Algorithm 4-3. The conditions on the differential path
imposed by Algorithm 4-3 can easily be met because, as
mentioned in Section 4.3.1, forward and backward bit-
conditions in the differential path are interchangeable.
Steps 10 through 15 of Algorithm 4-3 are its most com-
putationally intensive part, in particular for the toughest
differential paths in a chosen-prefix collision, so they
should be optimized. Greater tunnel strength significantly
reduces the time spent there, because after step 15 all
tunnels are used.
In practice, in step c.4 of Algorithm 4-1 (cf. Sec-
tion 4.4) we keep only those full differential paths for
which tunnels T1, T2, T4 and T5 satisfy a certain lower
bound on their strength. Furthermore, of the full differen-
tial paths kept, we select those with the best properties
such as high tunnel strength and a low number of bitcon-
ditions on Q18, . . . , Q63.
4.5.3 Rotation bitconditions
As mentioned below Algorithm 4-3, it is assumed there
that all rotations in the first round will be correct with
probability very close to 1. In Algorithm 4-3, Q1, . . . , Q16
are chosen in a non-sequential order and also changed at
various steps in the algorithm. Ensuring correct rotations
in the first round would be cumbersome and it would
hardly avoid wasting time in a state where one or more
rotations in the first round would fail due to the various
tunnels. However, as shown in (Stevens, 2006), if we
use additional bitconditions qt[i] we can (almost) ensure
correct rotations in the first round, thereby (almost)
eliminating both the effort to verify rotations and the
wasted computing time. This is explained below.
We use the notation introduced in Section 4.4.4. Given
δTt and δRt it is easy to determine which partition (α, β)
satisfies RL((α, β), RCt) = δRt. The probability that this
correct rotation holds is not necessarily p(α,β) because
it may be assumed that bitconditions qt and qt+1 hold
and these directly affect Rt = Qt+1 −Qt and thus Tt =
RR(Rt, RCt). Hence, using bitconditions qt and qt+1 we
can try and increase the probability of a correct rotation
in step t to (almost) 1 in the following way.
The other three partitions (of the four listed in Sec-
tion 4.4.4) correspond to the incorrect rotations. Those
partitions are of the form
(αˆ, βˆ) = (α− λ0232−RCt , β + λ0232−RCt + λRCt232),
λ0, λRCt ∈ {−1, 0,+1}
where either λ0 6= 0 or λRCt 6= 0. They result in incorrect
δ̂Rt of the form
δ̂Rt = RL((αˆ, βˆ), RCt) = δRt + λ02
0 + λRCt2
RCt .
They are caused by a carry when adding δTt to Tt that
does or does not propagate: from bit position 32−RCt −
Copyright c© 2009 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Int. J. of Applied Cryptography, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2012 338
Algorithm 4-3 Collision finding algorithm.
Given a full differential path q−3, . . . , q64 consisting of only direct and backward bitconditions and the set T1, . . . , T8 of tunnels
from Table 4-5, perform the following steps:
1. Determine for all tunnels for which bits b the extra bitconditions as shown in Table 4-5 can be met. For each possible
case, apply compatible bitconditions to enforce the extra bitconditions and change the bitconditions qt[b] of the changed
or affected Qt[b] in the first round from ‘.’ to ‘0’.
2. Perform the steps below until a collision block has been found.
3. Select Q1, Q2, Q13, . . . , Q16 such that q1, q2, q13, . . . , q16 hold.
4. Compute m1, Q17.
5. If q17 holds and the rotation for t = 16 is successful, then proceed.
6. Store the set Z of all pairs (Q1, Q2) meeting q1, q2 that do not change m1 and
bits of Q2 involved in q3.
7. For all Q3, . . . , Q7 meeting q3, . . . , q7 do:
8. Compute m6, Q18.
9. If q18 holds and the rotation for t = 17 is successful, then proceed.
10. For all Q8, . . . , Q12 meeting q8, . . . , q12 do:
11. Compute m11, Q19.
12. If q19 holds and the rotation for t = 18 is successful, then proceed.
13. For all (Q1, Q2) in Z do:
14. Compute m0, Q20.
15. If q20 holds and the rotation for t = 19 is successful, then proceed.
16. For all values of the bits of tunnels T1, T2, T3 do:
17. Set the bits to those values and compute m5, Q21.
18. If q21 holds and the rotation for t = 20 is successful, then proceed.
19. For all values of the bits of tunnels T4, T5 do:
20. Set the bits to those values and compute m10, Q22.
21. If q22 holds and the rotation for t = 21 is successful, then proceed.
22. For all values of the bits of tunnel T6 do:
23. Set the bits to those values and compute m15, Q23.
24. If q23 holds and the rotation for t = 22 is successful, then proceed.
25. For all values of the bits of tunnel T7 do:
26. Set the bits to those values and compute m4, Q24.
27. If q24 holds and the rotation for t = 23 is successful, then proceed.
28. For all values of the bits of tunnel T8 do:
29. Set the bits to those values and compute m9, Q25.
30. If q25 holds and the rotation for t = 24 is successful, then proceed.
31. Compute m0, . . . ,m15, Q26, . . . , Q64 and Q
′
1, . . . , Q
′
64.
32. If δ̂Qt = Q
′
t −Qt agrees with qt for t = 61, 62, 63, 64, return M,M ′.
Computation of mi and Qi is performed at t = i and t = i− 1, respectively.
We assume that the rotations in the first round have probability very close to 1 to be correct, and therefore do not verify them.
This is further explained in Section 4.5.3.
1 to 32−RCt for λ0 6= 0 and from bit position 31 to 32
for λRCt 6= 0. Since we chose the partition (α, β) with
highest probability, this usually means that we have to
prevent instead of ensure those propagations in order to
decrease the probability that λ0 6= 0 or λRCt 6= 0.
To almost guarantee proper rotations in each step of
Algorithm 4-3, additional bitconditions can be determined
by hand, as shown in (Stevens, 2006). It was seen that
adding bitconditions on Qt, Qt+1 around bit positions
31−RCt + i and lower helps preventing λi 6= 0. This
can be automated using a limited brute-force search,
separately handling the cases λ0 6= 0 and λRCt 6= 0.
Let i ∈ {0, RCt}. Given bitconditions qt, qt+1, we es-
timate Pr[λi 6= 0|qt, qt+1] by sampling a small set of
Q̂t, Q̂t+1 satisfying qt, qt+1, e.g. of size 2
11, and deter-
Copyright c© 2009 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
Int. J. of Applied Cryptography, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2012 339
mining the fraction where λi = NAF(δ̂Rt − δRt)[[i]] 6= 0
using
δ̂Rt = RL(RR(Q̂t+1 − Q̂t, RCt) + δTt, RCt).
Using this approach, we estimate the probability
that λi = 0 by selecting a small search bound B
and exhaustively trying all combinations of additional
bitconditions on Qt[b], Qt+1[b] for b = 31−RCt + i−
B, . . . , 31−RCt + i. Finally, if there are any bitcondi-
tions (q′t, q
′
t+1) for which Pr[λi 6= 0|q′t, q′t+1] is negligible,
we select the pair (q′t, q
′
t+1) that leads to the smallest num-
ber of additional bitconditions and for which Pr[λ0 =
λRCt = 0|qt−1, q′t] and Pr[λ0 = λRCt = 0|q′t+1, qt+2] do
not decrease significantly for step t− 1 and t+ 1, respec-
tively.
4.6 Implementation remarks
Our software to construct chosen-prefix collisions consists
of five main components that perform the following tasks:
1. the birthday search (with a special implementation
for Sony’s PlayStation 3);
2. forward extension of a given set of partial lower
differential paths by a given step t, saving only the
paths with the fewest bitconditions;
3. backward extension of a given set of partial upper
differential paths by a given step t, saving only the
paths with the fewest bitconditions;
4. attempt to connect all combinations of given lower
and upper differential paths;
5. coordinate the four earlier tasks by preparing the
required inputfiles, collect the outputs, and search
for near-collision blocks.
These tasks are carried out as described in the earlier
sections. A few remarks are in order. The first task is the
most computationally expensive one and consists mostly
of simple applications of the MD5 compression function.
It turns out that the Cell processor, contained in the
PlayStation 3 game console, can be made to perform this
task about 30 times faster than a regular 32-bit PC core.
More details on the peculiarities of the PlayStation 3
implementation are described in Section 5.2.2.
For the second and third task we exhaustively try all
limited weight BSDRs of δQt, all possible δFt’s, and we
use the highest-probability rotation. We keep at most
a preset number of paths with the lowest number of
bitconditions that have a preset minimum total strength
over tunnels T1, T2, T4, and T5. Each of the programs is
designed to execute several separate but parallel threads.
4.7 Complexity analysis
The overall complexity of the chosen-prefix collision at-
tack depends on the parameters used for the birthday
search and the construction of pairs of near-collision
blocks. This involves various trade-offs and is described
in this section.
The birthday search complexity depends on the pa-
rameter w (defining the family of differential paths), the
upper bound on the number r of pairs of near-collision
blocks, the size 264+k of the search space, and the amount
of available memory M . For various parameter choices of
r, k and w we have tabulated the heuristically determined
expected birthday search complexities and memory re-
quirements in Appendix C (in practice it is advisable to
use a small factor more memory than required to achieve
Ccoll  Ctr). Given r, w and M , the optimal value for
k and the resulting birthday complexity can thus easily
be looked up. When r is left free, one can balance the
birthday complexity and the complexity of constructing
r pairs of near-collision blocks.
Each pair of near-collision blocks requires construction
of a set of full differential paths followed by the actual
construction of the pair of near-collision blocks. The
complexity of the former construction depends on several
parameter choices, such as the size of the sets of lower
and upper differential paths, and the restraints used when
selecting BSDRs for a δQt. Naturally, a higher overall
quality of the resulting complete differential paths, i.e.,
a low number of overall bitconditions and a high total
tunnel strength, generally results when more effort is
put into the construction. For practical purposes we
have found parameters sufficient for almost all cases (as
applicable to the chosen-prefix collision attack) that have
an average total complexity equivalent to roughly 235
MD5 compressions.
The complexity of the collision finding, i.e., the con-
struction of a pair of near-collision blocks, depends on
the parameter w, the total tunnel strength and the num-
ber of bitconditions in the last 2.5 rounds. For small
w = 0, 1, 2 and paths based on Table 4-1, the construc-
tion requires on average roughly the equivalent of 234
MD5 compressions. Combined with the construction of
the differential paths, this leads to the rough overall esti-
mate of about 235.6 MD5 compressions to find a single
pair of near-collision blocks for a chosen-prefix collision
attack.
With w = 2 and optimizing for overall complexity
this leads to the optimal parameter choices r = 9 and
k = 0. For these choices, the birthday search cost is
about 237 MD5 compressions and constructing the r =
9 pairs of near-collision blocks costs about 238.8 MD5
compressions. The overall complexity is thus estimated
at roughly 239.1 MD5 compressions, which takes about 35
hours on a single PC-core. For this parameter choice the
memory requirements for the birthday search are very
low, even negligible compared to the several hundreds
of MBs required for the construction of the differential
paths.
With more specific demands, such as a small number
r of near-collision blocks possibly in combination with
a relatively low M , the overall complexity will increase.
As an example, our rogue CA construction required at
most r = 3 near-collision blocks, and using M = 5TB
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this results in an overall complexity of about 249 MD5
compressions.
4.8 Single-block chosen-prefix collision
Using a different approach it is even possible to con-
struct a chosen-prefix collision using only a single pair
of near-collision blocks. Together with 84 birthday bits,
the chosen-prefix collision-causing appendages are only
84 + 512 = 596 bits long. This approach is based on an
even richer family of differential paths that allows elim-
ination using a single pair of near-collision blocks of a
set of δIHVs that is bounded enough so that finding the
near-collision blocks is still feasible, but large enough
that such a δIHV can be found efficiently by a birthday
search. Instead of using the family of differential paths
based on δm11 = ±2i, we use the fastest known collision
attack for MD5 and vary the last few steps to find a large
family of differential paths.
We first present a new collision attack for MD5
with complexity of approximately 216 MD5 compressions
improving upon the 220.96 MD5 compressions required
in (Xie, Liu, and Feng, 2008). Our starting point is the
partial differential path for MD5 given in Table 4-6. It is
based on message differences δm2 = 2
8, δm4 = δm14 =
231 and δm11 = 2
15 which is very similar to those used
by Wang et al. in (Wang and Yu, 2005) for the first col-
lision attack against MD5. This partial differential path
can be used for a near-collision attack with complexity
of approximately 214.8 MD5 compressions.
This leads in the usual fashion to an identical-prefix
collision attack for MD5 that requires approximately 216
MD5 compressions, since one has to do it twice: first
to add differences to δIHV and then to eliminate them
again. It should be noted that usually bitconditions are
required on the IHV and IHV′ between the two collision
blocks which imply an extra factor in complexity. In
the present case, however, we can construct a large set
of differential paths for the second near-collision block
that will cover all bitconditions that are likely to occur,
thereby avoiding the extra complexity.
By properly tuning the birthday search, the same
partial differential path leads to the construction of a sin-
gle near-collision block chosen-prefix collision for MD5.
By varying the last steps of the differential path and
by allowing the collision finding complexity to grow by
a factor of about 226, we have found a set S of about
223.3 different δIHV = (δa, δb, δc, δd) of the form δa =
−25, δd = −25 + 225, δc = −25 mod 220 that can be elim-
inated. Such δIHVs can be found using an 84-bit birthday
search with step function f : {0, 1}84 → {0, 1}84 of the
form
f(x) ={
φ(MD5compress(IHV, B‖x) + δÎHV) if σ(x) = 0
φ(MD5compress(IHV′, B′‖x)) if σ(x) = 1,
where δÎHV is of the required form, σ : x 7→ {0, 1} is a
balanced selector function and φ(a, b, c, d) 7→ a‖d‖(c mod
220). There are 2128−84 = 244 possible δIHVs of this form,
of which only about 223.3 are in the allowed set S. It
follows that a birthday collision has probability p =
223.3/(244 · 2) = 2−21.7 to be useful, where the additional
factor 2 stems from the fact that different prefixes are
required.
A useful birthday collision can be expected after√
pi284/(2p) ≈ 253.2 MD5 compressions, requires 400MB
of storage and takes about 3 days on 215 PS3s. The
expected complexity of finding the actual near-collision
blocks is bounded by about 214.8+26 = 240.8 MD5 com-
pressions.
In Table 4-7 two 128-byte messages are given both
consisting of a 52-byte chosen prefix and a 76-byte single-
block chosen-prefix collision suffix and with colliding
MD5 hash value D320B6433D8EBC1AC65711705721C2E1.
Table 4-7 Example single-block chosen-prefix collision.
Message 1
4F 64 65 64 20 47 6F 6C 64 72 65 69 63 68 0A 4F
64 65 64 20 47 6F 6C 64 72 65 69 63 68 0A 4F 64
65 64 20 47 6F 6C 64 72 65 69 63 68 0A 4F 64 65
64 20 47 6F D8 05 0D 00 19 BB 93 18 92 4C AA 96
DC E3 5C B8 35 B3 49 E1 44 E9 8C 50 C2 2C F4 61
24 4A 40 64 BF 1A FA EC C5 82 0D 42 8A D3 8D 6B
EC 89 A5 AD 51 E2 90 63 DD 79 B1 6C F6 7C 12 97
86 47 F5 AF 12 3D E3 AC F8 44 08 5C D0 25 B9 56
Message 2
4E 65 61 6C 20 4B 6F 62 6C 69 74 7A 0A 4E 65 61
6C 20 4B 6F 62 6C 69 74 7A 0A 4E 65 61 6C 20 4B
6F 62 6C 69 74 7A 0A 4E 65 61 6C 20 4B 6F 62 6C
69 74 7A 0A 75 B8 0E 00 35 F3 D2 C9 09 AF 1B AD
DC E3 5C B8 35 B3 49 E1 44 E8 8C 50 C2 2C F4 61
24 4A 40 E4 BF 1A FA EC C5 82 0D 42 8A D3 8D 6B
EC 89 A5 AD 51 E2 90 63 DD 79 B1 6C F6 FC 11 97
86 47 F5 AF 12 3D E3 AC F8 44 08 DC D0 25 B9 56
5 Applications of chosen-prefix collisions
When exploiting collisions in real world applications two
major obstacles must be overcome.
• The problem of meaningful collisions. Given current
methods, collisions require appendages consisting of
unpredictable and mostly uncontrollable bitstrings.
These must be hidden in the usually heavily for-
matted application data structure without raising
suspicion.
• The problem of realistic attack scenarios. As we do
not have effective attacks against MD5’s (second)
preimage resistance but only collision attacks, we
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Table 4-6 Partial differential path for fast near-collision attack. Partial differential path for t = 29, . . . , 63 using message
differences δm2 = 2
8, δm4 = δm14 = 2
31, δm11 = 2
15. The probability that it is satisfied is approximately 2−14.5.
t δQt δFt δWt δTt δRt RCt
26 −28
27 0
28 0
29 0 0 28 0 0 9
30− 33 0 0 0 0 0 ·
34 0 0 215 215 231 16
35 231 231 231 0 0 23
36 231 0 0 0 0 4
37 231 231 231 0 0 11
38− 46 231 231 0 0 0 ·
47 231 231 28 28 231 23
48 0 0 0 0 0 6
49 0 0 0 0 0 10
50 0 0 231 0 0 15
51− 59 0 0 0 0 0 ·
60 0 0 231 231 −25 6
61 −25 0 215 215 225 10
62 −25 + 225 0 28 28 223 15
63 −25 + 225 + 223 25 − 223 0 25 − 223 226 − 214 21
64 −25 + 225 + 223 + 226 − 214
cannot target existing MD5-values. In particular,
the colliding data structures must be generated
simultaneously, along with their shared hash, by
the adversary.
In Section 5.1 several chosen-prefix collision applications
are surveyed where these problems are addressed with
varying degrees of success. Sections 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4
describe the three most prominent applications in more
detail.
5.1 A survey of potential applications
We mention some potential applications of chosen-prefix
collisions.
Digital certificates. Given how heavily they rely on
cryptographic hash functions, digital certificates
are the first place to look for applications of chosen-
prefix collisions. Two X.509 certificates are said to
collide if their to-be-signed parts have the same
hash and consequently their digital signatures, as
provided by the CA, are identical. In earlier work
(cf. (Lenstra and de Weger, 2005)) we have shown
how identical-prefix collisions can be used to con-
struct colliding X.509 certificates with different
RSA moduli but identical Distinguished Names.
Here the RSA moduli absorbed the random-looking
near-collision blocks, thus inconspicuously and ele-
gantly solving the meaningfulness problem. Allow-
ing different Distinguished Names required chosen-
prefix collisions, as shown in (Stevens, Lenstra, and
de Weger, 2007). The certificates resulting from
both constructions do not contain spurious bits, so
superficial inspection at bit level of either of the
certificates will not reveal the existence of a sibling
certificate that collides with it signature-wise. Nev-
ertheless, for these constructions to work the entire
to-be-signed parts, and thus the signing CA, must
be fully under our own control, thereby limiting
the practical attack potential.
A related but in detail rather different construction
was carried out in collaboration with Alexander
Sotirov, Jacob Appelbaum, David Molnar, and Dag
Arne Osvik, as reported on http://www.win.tue.
nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/ and in (Stevens et al.,
2009). Although in practice a certificate’s to-be-
signed part cannot be for 100% under control of
the party that submits the certification request, for
some commercial CAs (that still used MD5 for their
digital signature generation) the entire to-be-signed
part could be predicted reliably enough to make the
following guess-and-check approach practically fea-
sible: prepare the prefix of the to-be-signed part of
a legitimate certification request including a guess
for the part that will be included by the CA upon
certification, prepare a rogue to-be-signed prefix,
determine different collision-causing and identical
collision-maintaining appendages to complete two
colliding to-be-signed parts, and submit the legit-
imate one for certification. If upon receipt of the
legitimate certificate the guess turns out to have
been correct, then the rogue certificate can be com-
pleted by pasting the CA’s signature of the legiti-
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mate data onto the rogue data: because the data
collide, the signature will be equally valid for both.
Otherwise, if the guess is incorrect, another attempt
is made. Using this approach we managed (upon
the 4th attempt) to trick a commercial CA into
providing a signature valid for a rogue CA certifi-
cate. For the intricate details of the construction
we refer to Section 5.2.
A few additional remarks about this construction
are in order here. We created not just a rogue
certificate, but a rogue CA certificate, containing
identifying information and public key material for
a rogue CA. The private key of this rogue CA is
under our control. As the commercial CA’s sig-
nature is valid for the rogue CA certificate, all
certificates issued by the rogue CA are trusted by
anybody trusting the commercial CA. As the com-
mercial CA’s root certificate is present in all major
browsers, this gives us in principle the possibility
to impersonate any certificate owner. This is cer-
tainly a realistic attack scenario. The price that
we have to pay is that the meaningfulness prob-
lem is only adequately -- and most certainly not
elegantly -- solved: as further explained in the next
paragraph, one of the certificates contains a consid-
erable number of suspicious-looking bits. It must be
noted here that browser vendors such as Microsoft,
Mozilla and Google and other software companies,
can revoke the trust in any CA certificate in their
products if deemed necessary.
To indicate that a certificate is a CA certificate,
a certain bit has to be set in the certificate’s to-
be-signed-part. According to the X.509v3 stan-
dard (Cooper et al., 2008), this bit comes after the
public key field. It is unlikely that a commercial
CA will accept a certification request where the CA
bit is set. Therefore, the bit must not be set in the
legitimate request. For our rogue CA certificate con-
struction, the fact that the two to-be-signed parts
must contain a different bit after the public key
field causes an incompatibility with our ‘usual’ col-
liding certificate construction as in (Lenstra and de
Weger, 2005) and (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger,
2007). In that construction the collision-causing ap-
pendages correspond to the high order bits of RSA
moduli, and they are followed by identical collision-
maintaining appendages that transform the two
appendages into valid RSA moduli. Anything fol-
lowing after the moduli must remain identical lest
the collision property goes lost. As a consequence,
the appendages on the rogue side can no longer
be hidden in the public key field and some other
field must be found for them. Such a field may be
specially defined for this purpose, or an existing
(proprietary) extension may be used. The Netscape
Comment extension is a good example of the lat-
ter, as we found that it is ignored by the major
certificate processing software. The upshot is, how-
ever, that as the appendages have non-negligible
length, it will be hard to define a field that will not
look suspicious to someone who looks at the rogue
certificate at bit level.
Colliding documents. In (Daum and Lucks, 2005)
(see also (Gebhardt, Illies and Schindler, 2005)) it
was shown how to construct a pair of PostScript
files that collide under MD5, but that display dif-
ferent messages when viewed or printed. These
constructions use identical-prefix collisions, and
therefore they have to rely on the presence of both
messages in each of the colliding files and on macro-
functionalities of the document format used. Ob-
viously, this raises suspicion upon inspection at
bit level. With chosen-prefix collisions, one mes-
sage per colliding document suffices and macro-
functionalities are no longer required. For example,
using a document format that allows insertion of
color images (such as Microsoft Word or Adobe
PDF), inserting one message per document, two
documents can be made to collide by appending
carefully crafted color images after the messages.
A short one pixel wide line will do -- for instance
hidden inside a layout element, a company logo, or
a nicely colored barcode -- and preferably scaled
down to hardly visible size (or completely hidden
from view, as possible in PDF). An extension of
this construction is presented in the paragraphs
below and set forth in detail in Section 5.3.
Hash based commitments. Kelsey and Kohno
(Kelsey and Kohno, 2006) presented a method to
first commit to a hash value, and next to construct
faster than by a trivial pre-image attack a docu-
ment with the committed hash value, and with any
message of one’s choice as a prefix. The method ap-
plies to any Merkle-Damg˚ard hash function, such
as MD5, that given an IHV and a suffix produces
some IHV. Omitting details involving message
lengths and Merkle-Damg˚ard strengthening, the
idea is to commit to a hash value based on an IHV
at the root of a tree, either that IHV itself or cal-
culated as the hash of that IHV and some suffix at
the root. The tree is a complete binary tree and
is calculated from its leaves up to the root, so the
IHV at the root will be one of the last values calcu-
lated. This is done in such a way that each node of
the tree is associated with an IHV along with a suf-
fix that together hash to the IHV associated with
the node’s parent. Thus, two siblings have IHVs
and suffixes that collide under the hash function.
The IHVs at the leaves may be arbitrarily chosen
but are, preferably, all different. Given a prefix
of one’s choice one performs a brute-force search
for a suffix that, when appended to the prefix and
along with the standard IHV, results in the IHV at
one of the leaves (or nodes) of the tree. Appending
the suffixes one encounters on one’s way from that
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leave or node to the root, results in a final message
with the desired prefix and committed hash value.
Originally based on a birthday search, the con-
struction of the tree can be done more efficiently
by using chosen-prefix collisions to construct sib-
ling node suffixes based on their IHVs. For MD5,
however, it remains far from feasible to carry out
the entire construction in practice. In a variant
that is feasible, one commits to a prediction by
publishing its hash value. In due time one reveals
the correct prediction, chosen from among a large
enough preconstructed collection of documents that,
due to tree-structured chosen-prefix collision ap-
pendages, all share the same published hash value.
In section 5.3 we present an example involving 12
documents.
Software integrity checking. In (Kaminsky, 2004)
and (Mikle, 2004) it was shown how any exist-
ing MD5 collision, such as the ones originally
presented by Xiaoyun Wang at the CRYPTO
2004 rump session, can be abused to mislead
integrity checking software that uses MD5. A
similar application, using freshly made colli-
sions, was given on http://www.mathstat.dal.
ca/~selinger/md5collision/. See also (Gau-
ravaram, McCullagh, and Dawson, 2006). As shown
on http://blog.didierstevens.com/2009/01/
17/ this can even be done within the framework
of Microsoft’s Authenticode code signing program.
All these results use identical-prefix collisions and,
similar to the colliding PostScript application men-
tioned earlier, differences in the colliding inputs are
used to construct deviating execution flows.
Chosen-prefix collisions allow a more elegant ap-
proach, since common operating systems ignore
bitstrings that are appended to executables: the
programs will run unaltered. Thus, using tree-
structured chosen-prefix collision appendages as
above, any number of executables can be made
to have the same MD5 hash value or MD5-based
digital signature. See Section 5.4 for an example.
One can imagine two executables: a ‘good’ one (say
Word.exe) and a bad one (the attacker’s Worse.exe).
A chosen-prefix collision for those executables is
computed, and the collision-causing bitstrings are
appended to both executables. The resulting al-
tered file Word.exe, functionally equivalent to the
original Word.exe, can be offered to a code sign-
ing program such as Microsoft’s Authenticode and
receive an ‘official’ MD5-based digital signature.
This signature will then be equally valid for the at-
tacker’s Worse.exe, and the attacker might be able
to replace Word.exe by his Worse.exe (renamed to
Word.exe) on the appropriate download site. This
construction affects a common functionality of MD5
hashing and may pose a practical threat. It also al-
lows people to get many executables signed at once
and for free by getting a single executable signed,
bypassing verification of any kind (e.g. authenticity,
quality, compatibility, non-spyware, non-malware)
by the signing party.
Computer forensics. In computer forensics so-called
hash sets are used to quickly identify known files.
For example, when a hard disk is seized by law en-
forcement officers, they may compute the hashes of
all files on the disk, and compare those hashes to
hashes in existing hash sets: a whitelist (for known
harmless files such as operating system and other
common software files) and a blacklist (for pre-
viously identified harmful files). Only files whose
hashes do not occur in either hash set have to be in-
spected further. A useful feature of this method of
recognizing files is that the file name itself is irrele-
vant, since only the content of the file is hashed.
MD5 is a popular hash function for this applica-
tion. Examples are NIST’s National Software Ref-
erence Library Reference Data Set (http://www.
nsrl.nist.gov/) and the US Department of Jus-
tice’s Hashkeeper application (http://www.usdoj.
gov/ndic/domex/hashkeeper.htm).
A conceivable, and rather obvious, attack on this
application of hashes is to produce a harmless file
(e.g. an innocent picture) and a harmful one (e.g.
an illegal picture), and insert collision blocks that
will not be noticed by common application software
or human viewers. In a learning phase the harmless
file might be submitted to the hash set and thus
the common hash may end up on the whitelist. The
harmful file will be overlooked from then on.
Peer to peer software. Hash sets are also used in peer
to peer software. A site offering content may main-
tain a list of pairs (file name, hash). The file name
is local only, and the peer to peer software uniquely
identifies the file’s content by means of its hash.
Depending on how the hash is computed such
systems may be vulnerable to a chosen-prefix at-
tack. Software such as eDonkey and eMule use
MD4 to hash the content in a two stage man-
ner: the identifier of the content c1‖c2‖ . . . ‖cn is
MD4(MD4(c1)‖ . . . ‖MD4(cn)), where the chunks
ci are about 9 MB each. One-chunk files, i.e., files
not larger than 9 MB, are most likely vulnerable;
whether multi-chunk files are vulnerable is open for
research. We have not worked out the details of a
chosen-prefix collision attack against MD4, but this
seems very well doable by adapting our methods
and should result in an attack that is considerably
faster than our present one against MD5.
Content addressed storage. In recent years content
addressed storage is gaining popularity as a means
of storing fixed content at a physical location of
which the address is directly derived from the con-
tent itself. For example, a hash of the content
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may be used as the file name. See (Primmer and
D’Halluin, 2005) for an example. Clearly, chosen-
prefix collisions can be used by an attacker to fool
such storage systems, e.g. by first preparing col-
liding pairs of files, by then storing the harmless-
looking first one, and later overwriting it with the
harmful second one.
Further investigations are required to assess the impact
of chosen-prefix collisions. We leave it to others to study
to what extent commonly used protocols and message for-
mats such as TLS, S/MIME (CMS), IPSec and XML Sig-
natures (see (Bellovin and Rescorla, 2006) and (Hoffman
and Schneier, 2005)) allow insertion of random looking
data that may be overlooked by some or all implemen-
tations. The threat posed by identical-prefix collisions
is not well understood either: their application may be
more limited, but for MD5 they can be generated al-
most instantaneously and thus allow real-time attacks
on the execution of cryptographic protocols, and, more
importantly, for SHA-1 they may soon be feasible.
5.2 Creating a rogue Certification Authority
certificate
This section contains an in-depth discussion of the prac-
tical dangers posed by rogue Certification Authority cer-
tificates, followed by a detailed description of how we
managed to construct such a certificate.
The work reported here was carried out in close col-
laboration with Alexander Sotirov and Dag Arne Osvik,
and was triggered by email exchanges with Alexander
Sotirov, Jacob Appelbaum and David Molnar.
5.2.1 Attack potential of rogue CA certificates
In the conference version (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger,
2007, Section 4.1) of this paper we daydreamed:
‘‘Ideally, a realistic attack targets the core of PKI:
provide a relying party with trust, beyond reasonable
cryptographic doubt, that the person indicated by the
Distinguished Name field has exclusive control over
the private key corresponding to the public key in the
certificate. The attack should also enable the attacker
to cover his trails.’’
Our dream scenario has been, mostly, realized with the
construction of a rogue CA certificate. With the private
key of a CA under our control, and the public key appear-
ing in a certificate with a valid signature of a commercial
CA that is trusted by all major browsers, we can create
‘trusted’ certificates at will. When scrutinized at bit level,
however, our rogue CA certificate may look suspicious
which may, ultimately, expose us. Bit level inspection is
not something many users will engage in -- if they know
the difference between https and http to begin with --
and, obviously, the software that is supposed to inspect
a certificate’s bits is expertly guided around the suspi-
cious ones. So, it may be argued that our construction
has a non-negligible attack potential. Below we discuss
some possibilities in this direction. Upfront, however, we
like to point out that our rogue CA is nothing more than
a proof of concept that is incapable of doing much harm,
because it expired, on purpose, in September of 2004, i.e.,
more than 4 years before it was created.
Any website secured using TLS can be impersonated
using a rogue certificate issued by a rogue CA. This
is irrespective of which CA issued the website’s true
certificate and of any property of that certificate (such
as the hash function it is based upon -- SHA-256 is not
any better in this context than MD4). Combined with
redirection attacks where http requests are redirected to
rogue web servers, this leads to virtually undetectable
phishing attacks.
But any application involving a Certification Author-
ity that provides MD5-based certificates with sufficiently
predictable serial number and validity period may be
vulnerable. In contexts different from TLS this may in-
clude signing or encryption of e-mail or software, non-
repudiation services, etc.
As pointed out earlier, bit-level inspection of our rogue
CA certificate will reveal a relatively large number of
bits that may look suspicious -- and that are suspicious.
This could have been avoided if we had chosen to create
a rogue certificate for a regular website, as opposed to
a rogue CA certificate, because in that case we could
have hidden all collision causing bits inside the public
keys. Nevertheless, even if each resulting certificate by
itself looks unsuspicious, as soon as a dispute arises, the
rogue certificate’s legitimate sibling can be located with
the help of the CA, and the fraud becomes apparent by
putting the certificates alongside, thus exposing the party
responsible for the fraud.
Our attack relies on our ability to predict the content
of the certificate fields inserted by the CA upon certi-
fication: if our prediction is correct with non-negligible
probability, a rogue certificate can be generated with the
same non-negligible probability. Irrespective of the weak-
nesses, known or unknown, of the cryptographic hash
function used for digital signature generation, our type
of attack becomes effectively impossible if the CA adds
a sufficient amount of fresh randomness to the certifi-
cate fields before the public key fields. Relying parties,
however, cannot verify this randomness and also the
trustworthiness of certificates should not crucially de-
pend on such secondary and circumstantial aspects. We
would be in favor of a more fundamental solution -- along
with a strong cryptographic hash function -- possibly
along the lines as proposed in (Halevi and Krawczyk,
2006). Generally speaking, it is advisable not to sign data
that is completely determined by some other party. Put
differently, a signer should always make a few trivial
and unpredictable modifications before digitally signing
a document provided by someone else.
Based on our previous work (Stevens, Lenstra, and
de Weger, 2007), the issue in the previous paragraph was
recognized and the possibility of the attack presented
in this paper anticipated in the catalogue (BSI, 2007)
of algorithms suitable for the German Signature Law
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(‘Signaturgesetz’). This catalogue includes conditions and
time frames for cryptographic hash algorithms to be used
in legally binding digital signatures in Germany. One of
the changes introduced in the 2008 version of the catalog
is an explicit condition on the usage of SHA-1: only until
2010, and only for so-called ‘‘qualified certificates’’ that
contain at least 20 bits of entropy in their serial numbers.
We are grateful to Prof. Werner Schindler of the BSI for
bringing this to our attention and for confirming that
this change was introduced to thwart exactly the type of
rogue certificates that we present here for MD5.
We stress that our attack on MD5 is not a preimage
or second preimage attack. We cannot create a rogue cer-
tificate having a signature in common with a certificate
that was not especially crafted using our chosen-prefix
collision. In particular, we cannot target any existing,
independently created certificate and forge a rogue cer-
tificate that shares its digital signature with the digital
signature of the targeted certificate. However, given any
certificate with an MD5-based digital signature, a relying
party cannot easily recognize if it is trustworthy or, on the
contrary, crafted by our method. Therefore we repeat our
urgent recommendation not to use MD5 for new X.509
certificates. How existing MD5 certificates should be han-
dled is a subject of further research. We also urgently
recommend to reconsider usage of MD5 in other applica-
tions. Proper alternatives are available; but compatibility
with existing applications is obviously another matter.
Given potential developments related to SHA-1 (see (de
Cannie`re and Rechberger, 2006) and http://www.iaik.
tugraz.at/content/research/krypto/sha1/) we feel
that usage of SHA-1 in certificate generation should be
reassessed as well.
5.2.2 Certificate construction
Our first colliding X.509 certificate construction was
based on an identical-prefix collision, and resulted in
two certificates with different public keys, but identi-
cal Distinguished Name fields (Lenstra and de Weger,
2005). As a first application of chosen-prefix collisions we
showed how the Distinguished Name fields could be cho-
sen differently as well (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger,
2007). In this section we describe the details of a collid-
ing certificate construction that goes one step further by
also allowing different ‘‘basic constraints’’ fields. This
allows us to construct one of the certificates as an or-
dinary website certificate, but the other one as a CA
certificate. As already pointed out in Section 5.1, this
additional difference required a radical departure from
our traditional construction method from (Lenstra and
de Weger, 2005) and (Stevens, Lenstra, and de Weger,
2007). Furthermore, unlike our previous colliding certifi-
cate constructions where the CA was under our control,
a commercial CA provided the digital signature for the
(legitimate) website certificate. This required us to suffi-
ciently accurately predict its serial number and validity
period well before the certification request was submitted
to the signing CA.
We exploited the following weaknesses of the com-
mercial CA that carried out the legitimate certification
request:
• Its usage of the cryptographic hash function MD5
to generate digital signatures for new certificates.
• Its fully automated way to process online certifi-
cation requests that fails to recognize anomalous
behavior of requesting parties.
• Its usage of sequential serial numbers and its usage
of validity periods that are determined entirely by
the date and time in seconds at which the certifica-
tion request is processed.
• Its failure to enforce, by means of the ‘‘basic con-
straints’’ field in its own certificate, a limit on the
length of the chain of certificates that it can sign.
The first three points are further discussed below. The
last point, if properly handled, could have crippled our
rogue CA certificate but does not affect its construction.
A certificate contains a ‘‘basic constraints’’ field where a
bit is set to indicate if the certificate is a CA certificate.
With the bit set, a ‘‘path length constraint’’ subfield may
be present, specifying an integer that indicates how many
CAs may occur in the chain between the CA certificate
in question and end-user certificates. The commercial CA
that we interacted with failed to use this option in its own
certificate, implying that any number of intermediate
CAs is permitted. If the ‘‘path length constraint’’ would
have been present and set at 0 (zero), then our rogue CA
certificate could still have been constructed. But whether
or not the rogue CA certificate or certificates signed by
it can then also be used depends on (browser-)software
actually checking the ‘‘path length constraint’’ subfields
in chains of certificates. Thus a secondary ‘‘defense in
depth’’ mechanism was present that could have foiled
our attack, but failed to do so simply because it was not
used.
Before describing the construction of the colliding cer-
tificates, we briefly discuss the parameter choices used
for the chosen-prefix collision search. The 2048-bit up-
per bound on the length of RSA moduli, as enforced by
some CAs, combined with other limitations of our certifi-
cate construction, implied we could allow for at most 3
near-collision blocks. Opting for the least difficult possi-
bility (namely, 3 near-collision blocks), we had to decide
on values for k and the aimed for value for w, determin-
ing the costs of the birthday search and the near-collision
block constructions (cf. Sections 4.2 and 4.1), respec-
tively. Obviously, our choices were influenced by our
computational resources, namely a cluster of 215 PlaySta-
tion 3 (PS3) game consoles. When running Linux on a
PS3, applications have access to 6 Synergistic Process-
ing Units (SPUs), a general purpose CPU, and about
150MB of RAM per PS3. For the birthday search, the
6× 215 SPUs are computationally equivalent to approx-
imately 8600 regular 32-bit cores, due to each SPU’s
4× 32-bit wide SIMD architecture. The other parts of the
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chosen-prefix collision construction are not suitable for
the SPUs, but we were able to use the 215 PS3 CPUs for
the construction of the actual near-collision blocks. With
these resources, the choice w = 5 still turned out to be ac-
ceptable despite the 1000-fold increase in the cost of the
actual near-collision block construction. This is the case
even for the hard cases with many differences between
IHV and IHV′: as a consequence the differential paths
contain many bitconditions, which leaves little space for
the tunnels, thereby complicating the near-collision block
construction.
For the targeted 3 near-collision blocks, the entries
for w = 5 in the first table in Appendix C show the
time-memory tradeoff when the birthday search space
is varied with k. With 150MB at our disposal per PS3,
for a total of about 30GB, we decided to use k = 8 as
this optimizes the overall birthday complexity for the
plausible case that the birthday search takes
√
2 times
longer than expected. The resulting overall chosen-prefix
collision construction takes on average less than a day on
the PS3-cluster. In theory we could have used 1TB (or
more) of hard drive space, in which case it would have
been optimal to use k = 0 for a birthday search of about
20 PS3 days.
We summarize the construction of the colliding cer-
tificates in the sequence of steps below, and then describe
each step in more detail.
1. Construction of templates for the two to-be-signed
parts, as outlined in Figure 4. Note that we distin-
guish between a ‘legitimate’ to-be-signed part on
the left hand side, and a ‘rogue’ to-be-signed part
on other side.
2. Prediction of serial number and validity period for
the legitimate part, thereby completing the chosen
prefixes of both to-be-signed parts.
3. Computation of the two different collision-causing
appendages.
4. Computation of a single collision-maintaining ap-
pendage that will be appended to both sides,
thereby completing both to-be-signed parts.
5. Preparation of the certification request for the le-
gitimate to-be-signed part.
6. Submission of the certification request and receipt
of the new certificate.
7. If serial number and validity period of the newly
received certificate are as predicted, then the rogue
certificate can be completed. Otherwise return to
Step 2.
Step 1. Templates for the to-be-signed parts. In
this step all bits are set in the two to-be-signed parts,
except for bits that will be determined in later steps. For
the latter bits space will be reserved here. On the legiti-
mate side the parts to be filled in later are the predictions
for the serial number and validity period, and most bits
serial number
validity period
commercial CA name
domain name
2048 bit RSA public key
serial number
validity period
commercial CA name
rogue CA name
1024 bit RSA public key
legitimate website 
certificate rogue CA certificate
chosen prefixes
collision bits
identical suffixes
v3 extensions
tumor
“CA = TRUE”
v3 extensions
“CA = FALSE”
Figure 4 The to-be-signed parts of the colliding
certificates.
of the public key. On the rogue side the largest part of
the content of an extension field of the type ‘‘Netscape
Comment’’ is for the moment left undetermined. The
following roughly describes the sequence of steps.
• On the legitimate side, the chosen prefix contains
space for serial number and validity period, along
with the exact Distinguished Name of the com-
mercial CA where the certification request will be
submitted. This is followed by a subject Distin-
guished Name that contains a legitimate website
domain name (owned by one of us) consisting of as
many characters as allowed by the commercial CA
(in our case 64), and concluded by the first 208 bits
of an RSA modulus, the latter all chosen at random
after the leading ‘1’-bit. These sizes were chosen in
order to have as many corresponding bits as pos-
sible on the rogue side, while fixing as few bits as
possible of the RSA modulus on the legitimate side
(see Step 4 for the reason why).
• The corresponding bits on the rogue side contain
an arbitrarily chosen serial number, the same com-
mercial CA’s Distinguished Name, an arbitrarily
chosen validity period (actually chosen as indicat-
ing ‘‘August 2004’’, to avoid abuse of the rogue
certificate), a short rogue CA name, a 1024-bit RSA
public key generated using standard software, and
the beginning of the X.509v3 extension fields. One
of these fields is the ‘‘basic constraints’’ field, a
bit that we set to indicate that the rogue certifi-
cate will be a CA certificate (in Figure 4 this bit is
denoted by ‘‘CA=TRUE’’).
• At this point the entire chosen prefix is known on
the rogue side, but on the legitimate side predictions
for the serial number and validity period still need
to be inserted. That will be done in Step 2.
• The various field sizes were selected so that on both
sides the chosen prefixes are now 96 bits short of
the same MD5 block boundary. On both sides these
96 bit positions are reserved for the birthday bits.
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As only 64 + k = 72 birthday search bits per side
will be needed (and appended in Step 3) the first
24 bits at this point are set to 0. On the legitimate
side these 96 bits are part of the RSA modulus, on
the rogue side they are part of an extension field of
the type ‘‘Netscape Comment’’, denoted as ‘tumor’
in Figure 4.
• From here on forward, everything that goes to the
rogue side is part of the ‘‘Netscape Comment’’ field,
as it is not meaningful for the rogue CA certificate
but only appended to cause and maintain a collision
with bits added to the legitimate side. On the legit-
imate side we first make space for 3 near-collision
blocks of 512 bits each (calculated in Step 3) and
for 208 bits used to complete a 2048-bit RSA mod-
ulus (determined in Step 4), and then set the RSA
public exponent (for which we took the common
choice 65537) and the X.509v3 extensions includ-
ing the bit indicating that the legitimate certificate
will be an end-user certificate (in Figure 4 denoted
by ‘‘CA=FALSE’’).
Step 2. Prediction of serial number and validity
period. Based on repeated certification requests submit-
ted to the targeted commercial CA, it turned out that
the validity period can very reliably be predicted as the
period of precisely one year plus one day, starting exactly
six seconds after a request is submitted. So, to control
that field, all we need to do is select a validity period of
the right length, and submit the legitimate certification
request precisely six seconds before it starts. Though oc-
casional accidents may happen in the form of one-second
shifts, this was the easy part.
Predicting the serial number is harder but not impos-
sible. In the first place, it was found that the targeted
commercial CA uses sequential serial numbers. Being
able to predict the next serial number, however, is not
enough: the construction of the collision can be expected
to take at least a day, before which the serial number
and validity period have to be fixed, and only after which
the to-be-signed part of the certificate will be entirely
known. As a consequence, there will have been a sub-
stantial and uncertain increment in the serial number
by the time the collision construction is finished. So, an-
other essential ingredient of our construction was the fact
that the CA’s weekend workload is quite stable: it was
observed during several weekends that the increment in
serial number over a weekend does not vary a lot. This
allowed us to pretty reliably predict Monday morning’s
serial numbers on the Friday afternoon before. Thus, on
Friday afternoon we selected a number at the high end
of the predicted range for the next Monday morning, and
inserted it in the legitimate to-be-signed part along with
a validity period starting that same Monday morning at
the time corresponding to our serial number prediction.
See Step 6 how we then managed, after the weekend, to
target precisely the selected serial number and validity
period.
Step 3. Computation of the collision. At this point
both chosen prefixes have been fully determined so the
chosen-prefix collision can be computed: first the 72 birth-
day bits per side, calculated in parallel on the 1290 SPUs
of a cluster of 215 PS3s, followed by the calculation of 3
pairs of 512-bit near-collision blocks on the 215 PS3 CPUs.
The entire calculation takes on average about a day.
Given that we had a weekend available, and that
the calculation can be expected to take just a day, we
sequentially processed a number of chosen-prefixes, each
corresponding to different serial numbers and validity
periods (targeting both Monday and Tuesday mornings).
So, a near-collision block calculation on the CPUs would
always run simultaneously with a birthday search on the
SPUs for the ‘next’ attempt.
Step 4. Finishing the to-be-signed parts. At this
point the legitimate and rogue sides collide under MD5,
so that from here on only identical bits may be appended
to both sides.
With 208 + 24 + 72 + 3 ∗ 512 = 1840 bits set, the re-
maining 2048− 1840 = 208 bits need to be set for the
2048-bit RSA modulus on the legitimate side. Since in
the next step the RSA private exponent corresponding
to the RSA public exponent is needed, the full factoriza-
tion of the RSA modulus needs to be known, and the
factors must be compatible with the choice of the RSA
public exponent. Common CAs (including our targeted
commercial CA) do not check for compositeness of RSA
moduli in certification requests, implying that we could
simply have added 208 bits to make the RSA modulus
a prime. We found that approach unsatisfactory, and
opted for the rather crude but trivial to program method
sketched below that results in a 224-bit prime factor with
a prime 1824-bit cofactor. Given that at the time this
work was done the largest factor found using the elliptic
curve integer factorization method was 222 bits long, a
224-bit smallest prime factor keeps the resulting modu-
lus out of reach of common factoring efforts. We could
have used a relatively advanced lattice-based method to
try and squeeze in a 312-bit prime factor along with a
prime 1736-bit cofactor. Given only 208 bits of freedom
to select a 2048-bit RSA modulus, it is unlikely that a
more balanced solution can efficiently be found. Thus
the reason why as few bits as possible should be fixed
in Step 1, is that it allows us to construct a slightly less
unbalanced RSA modulus.
Let N be the 2048-bit integer consisting of the 1840
already determined bits of the RSA modulus-to-be, fol-
lowed by 208 one bits. We select a 224-bit integer p at
random until N mod p is less than 2208, and keep do-
ing this until both p and q = bN/pc are prime and the
RSA public exponent is coprime to (p− 1)(q − 1). Once
such primes p and q have been found, the number pq will
be the legitimate side’s RSA modulus, the leading 1840
bits of which are already present in the legitimate side’s
to-be-signed part, and the 208 least significant bits of
which are inserted in both to-be-signed parts.
To analyse the required effort somewhat more in
general, 2k−208 integers of k bits (with k > 208) need
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to be selected on average for pq to have the desired
1840 leading bits. Since an `-bit integer is prime with
probability approximately 1/ log(2`), a total of k(2048−
k)2k−208(log 2)2 attempts may be expected before a suit-
able RSA modulus is found. The coprimality requirement
is a lower order effect that we disregard. Note that for
k(k − 2048)(log 2)2 of the attempts the k-bit number p
has to be tested for primality, and that for (2048− k) log 2
of those q needs to be tested as well (on average, obvi-
ously). For k = 224 this turned out to be doable in a few
minutes on a standard PC.
This completes the to-be-signed parts on both sides.
Now it remains to be hoped that the legitimate part that
actually will be signed corresponds, bit for bit, with the
legitimate to-be-signed part that we concocted.
Step 5. Preparing the certification request. Using
the relevant information from the legitimate side’s tem-
plate, i.e., the subject Distinguished Name and the public
key, a PKCS#10 Certificate Signing Request is prepared.
The CA requires proof of possession of the private key
corresponding to the public key in the request. This is
done by signing the request using the private key -- this is
the sole reason that we need the RSA private exponent.
Step 6. Submission of the certification request.
The targeted legitimate to-be-signed part contains a very
specific validity period that leaves no choice for the mo-
ment at which the certification request needs to be sub-
mitted to the CA. Just hoping that at that time the
serial number would have precisely the predicted value
is unlikely to work, so a somewhat more elaborate ap-
proach is used. About half an hour before the targeted
submission moment, the same request is submitted, and
the serial number in the resulting certificate is inspected.
If it is already too high, the entire attempt is abandoned.
Otherwise, the request is repeatedly submitted, with a
frequency depending on the gap that may still exist be-
tween the serial number received and the targeted one,
and taking into account possible certification requests by
others. In this way the serial number is slowly nudged
toward the right value at the right time. Although there
is nothing illegal about repeated certification requests, it
should be possible for a CA to recognize the somewhat
anomalous behavior sketched above and to take appro-
priate countermeasures (such as random delays or jumps
in serial numbers) if it occurs.
Various types of accidents may happen, of course, and
we experienced some of them, such as another CA cus-
tomer ‘stealing’ our targeted serial number just a few
moments before our attempt to get it, thereby wasting
that weekend’s calculations. But, after the fourth week-
end it worked as planned, and we managed to get an
actually signed part that exactly matched our predicted
legitimate to-be-signed part.
Step 7. Creation of the rogue certificate. Given the
perfect match between the actually signed part and the
hoped for one, and the MD5 collision between the latter
and the rogue side’s to-be-signed part, the MD5-based
digital signature present in the legitimate certificate as
provided by the commercial CA is equally valid for the
rogue side. To finish the rogue CA certificate it suffices to
copy the digital signature to the right spot in the rogue
CA certificate.
The full details of the above construction, including
both certificates, can be found on http://www.win.tue.
nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/.
5.3 Nostradamus attack
In the original Nostradamus attack from (Kelsey and
Kohno, 2006) one first commits to a certain hash value,
and afterwards for any message constructs a document
that not only contains that message but that also has
under MD5 the committed hash value. So far, this attack
is, in its full generality, infeasible for MD5 because space
and time requirements are beyond what can be handled
at his point. It is easily doable, though, if a limited size
message space has been defined upfront.
Suppose there are messages m1,m2, . . . ,mr, then us-
ing r − 1 chosen-prefix collisions we can construct r suf-
fixes s1, s2, . . . , sr such that the r documents di = mi‖si
all have the same hash. After committing to the common
hash, afterwards any of the r documents d1, d2, . . . , dr can
be shown, possibly to achieve some malicious goal. The
other documents will remain hidden and their contents,
i.e., the mi-parts, cannot be derived -- with overwhelm-
ing probability -- from the single published document or
from the common hash value.
To show the practicality of this variant, we have
made an example consisting of 12 different PDF docu-
ments with a common MD5-hash, where each document
predicts a different outcome of the 2008 US presiden-
tial elections. The PDF format is convenient for this
purpose because it allows insertion of extra image ob-
jects that are unreferenced in the resulting document
and thus invisible in any common PDF reader. See the
next section for more on the PDF related details of the
construction and http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/
Nostradamus/ for the actual documents, one of which
correctly predicted the outcome one year before the elec-
tions took place. For each of the 11 collisions required
for this example we used a 64-bit birthday search (on a
single PS3) aiming for about 11 near-collision blocks (con-
structed on a quad-core PC). It took less than 2 days per
chosen-prefix collision. Since we performed those compu-
tations our methods have improved as described in this
paper, so this attack would now run much faster.
5.3.1 PDF construction
Given the structure of PDF documents it is not entirely
straightforward how to insert different chosen-prefix colli-
sion blocks, while keeping the parts following those blocks
identical in order to maintain the collision. The relevant
details of both the PDF structure and our construction
are covered here.
A PDF document is built up from the following 4 con-
secutive parts: a fixed header, a part consisting of an
arbitrary number of numbered objects, an object lookup
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table and, finally, a trailer. The trailer specifies the num-
ber of objects, which of the objects is the unique root
object (containing the document content) and which is
the info object (containing the document’s meta infor-
mation such as authors and title etc.), and contains a
filepointer to the start of the object lookup table.
Given a file containing a PDF document, additional
numbered objects can be inserted, as long as they are
added to the object lookup table and the corresponding
changes are made to the number of objects and the
filepointer in the trailer. A template for an image object
is given in Table 5-1. With the exception of the binary
image, the format is entirely text based. The binary image
is put between single line-feed characters (ASCII code 10)
and the result is encapsulated by the keywords stream
and endstream. The keyword /Length must specify the
byte length of the image. As the image is uncompressed
and each pixel requires three bytes (‘RGB’), the image byte
length must be three times the product of the specified
width and height. The object number (42 in the example
object header) must be set to the next available object
number.
When constructing colliding PDF files they must be
equal after the collision-causing data (cf. the ‘‘suffix’’ in
Figure 2). The object lookup tables and trailers for all
files must therefore be the same. This was achieved as
follows:
• As all documents must have the same number of
objects, dummy objects are inserted where neces-
sary.
• Since all root objects must have the same object
number, they can be copied if necessary to objects
with the next available object number.
• The info objects are treated in the same way as the
root objects.
• To make sure that all object lookup tables and
filepointers are identical, the objects can be sorted
by object number and if necessary padded with
spaces after their obj keyword to make sure that
all objects with the same object number have the
same file position and byte length in all files.
• Finally, the object lookup tables and trailers need
to be adapted to reflect the new situation -- as a
result they should be identical for all files.
Although this procedure works for basic PDF files (such
as PDF version 1.4 as we produced using pdflatex), it
should be noted that the PDF document format allows ad-
ditional features that may cause obstructions, the details
of which are irrelevant for this article.
Given r LATEX files with the desired subtle differences
(such as names of r different candidates), r different PDF
files are produced using a version of LATEX that is suitable
for our purposes (cf. above). In all these files a hidden
image object with a fixed object number is then inserted,
and the approach sketched above is followed to make the
lookup tables and trailers for all files identical. To ensure
that the files are identical after the hidden image contents,
their corresponding objects were made the last objects in
the files. This then leads to r chosen prefixes consisting of
the leading parts of the PDF files up to and including the
keyword stream and the first line-feed character. After
determining r − 1 chosen-prefix collisions resulting in
r collision-causing appendages, the appendages are put
in the proper binary image parts, after which all files
are completed with a line-feed character, the keywords
endstream and endobj, and the identical lookup tables
and trailers.
Note that the Length etc. fields have to be set before
collision finding, and that the value of Length will grow
logarithmically with r and linearly in the number of
near-collision blocks one is aiming for.
5.4 Colliding executables
Using the same set-up as used for the Nostradamus
attack reported in Section 5.3, i.e., 64-bit birthday
searching on a PS3 followed by the construction of
about 12 near-collision blocks on a quad-core PC, it
took us less than 2 days to create two different Win-
dows executables with the same MD5 hash. Initially
both 40960 bytes large, 13× 64 bytes had to be ap-
pended to each executable, for a resulting size of just
41792 bytes each, to let the files collide under MD5
without changing their functionality. See http://www.
win.tue.nl/hashclash/SoftIntCodeSign/ for details.
As noted above, it has been shown on http://blog.
didierstevens.com/2009/01/17/ that this attack can
be elevated to one on a code signing scheme.
As usual, the following remarks apply:
• An existing executable with a known and pub-
lished hash value not resulting from this con-
struction cannot be targeted by this attack
(cf. (Gauravaram, McCullagh, and Dawson, 2006)):
our attack is not a preimage or second preimage
attack. In order to attack a software integrity pro-
tection or code signing scheme using this approach,
the attacker must be able to manipulate the files
before they are hashed (and, possibly, signed).
Given the level of access required to realize the
attack an attacker can probably do more harm in
other simpler and more traditional ways.
• On the other hand, there is no guarantee that a
downloaded file with the proper hash or correct
signature is not the evil sibling of the intended
file. Especially when software integrity verification
takes place under the hood, users may be lured into
installing -- and trusting -- malware. Until a tool
is available that would also be able to distinguish
potentially malicious MD5-based certificates, all a
relying party can do is resorting to bit-level inspec-
tion of each executable; the latter requires more
expertise than most users can be expected to have,
in particular if the collision blocks are hidden at a
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Table 5-1 A numbered image object in the PDF format.
Part Contents
object header 42 0 obj
image header << /ColorSpace /DeviceRGB /Subtype /Image
image size /Length 9216 /Width 64 /Height 48 /BitsPerComponent 8
image contents >> stream...endstream
object footer endobj
less conspicious place than at the very end of the
executable.
• Any number r of executables can be made to collide,
at the cost of r − 1 chosen-prefix collisions and an
O(log r)-byte appendage to each of the r original
executables.
A countermeasure thwarting our attack would be the
inclusion of a self-checking component in software, i.e.,
where the software would check the integrity of its own
executable as the first step of the execution. It is better,
however, not to rely on cryptographic primitives such as
MD5 that fail to meet their design criteria.
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A MD5 compression function constants
t ACt RCt Wt
0 d76aa47816 7 m0
1 e8c7b75616 12 m1
2 242070db16 17 m2
3 c1bdceee16 22 m3
4 f57c0faf16 7 m4
5 4787c62a16 12 m5
6 a830461316 17 m6
7 fd46950116 22 m7
8 698098d816 7 m8
9 8b44f7af16 12 m9
10 ffff5bb116 17 m10
11 895cd7be16 22 m11
12 6b90112216 7 m12
13 fd98719316 12 m13
14 a679438e16 17 m14
15 49b4082116 22 m15
t ACt RCt Wt
16 f61e256216 5 m1
17 c040b34016 9 m6
18 265e5a5116 14 m11
19 e9b6c7aa16 20 m0
20 d62f105d16 5 m5
21 0244145316 9 m10
22 d8a1e68116 14 m15
23 e7d3fbc816 20 m4
24 21e1cde616 5 m9
25 c33707d616 9 m14
26 f4d50d8716 14 m3
27 455a14ed16 20 m8
28 a9e3e90516 5 m13
29 fcefa3f816 9 m2
30 676f02d916 14 m7
31 8d2a4c8a16 20 m12
t ACt RCt Wt
32 fffa394216 4 m5
33 8771f68116 11 m8
34 6d9d612216 16 m11
35 fde5380c16 23 m14
36 a4beea4416 4 m1
37 4bdecfa916 11 m4
38 f6bb4b6016 16 m7
39 bebfbc7016 23 m10
40 289b7ec616 4 m13
41 eaa127fa16 11 m0
42 d4ef308516 16 m3
43 04881d0516 23 m6
44 d9d4d03916 4 m9
45 e6db99e516 11 m12
46 1fa27cf816 16 m15
47 c4ac566516 23 m2
t ACt RCt Wt
48 f429224416 6 m0
49 432aff9716 10 m7
50 ab9423a716 15 m14
51 fc93a03916 21 m5
52 655b59c316 6 m12
53 8f0ccc9216 10 m3
54 ffeff47d16 15 m10
55 85845dd116 21 m1
56 6fa87e4f16 6 m8
57 fe2ce6e016 10 m15
58 a301431416 15 m6
59 4e0811a116 21 m13
60 f7537e8216 6 m4
61 bd3af23516 10 m11
62 2ad7d2bb16 15 m2
63 eb86d39116 21 m9
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B Boolean Function Bitconditions
The 4 tables in this appendix correspond to rounds 1
through 4, respectively, i.e., 0 ≤ t < 16, 16 ≤ t < 32,
32 ≤ t < 48 and 48 ≤ t < 64. The ‘abc’ in each of the
first columns denotes the three differential bitconditions
(qt[i], qt−1[i], qt−2[i]) for the relevant t and 0 ≤ i ≤ 31,
with each table containing all 27 possible triples.
Columns 2, 3, 4 contain forward bitconditions
FC(t, abc, g) for g = 0,+1,−1, respectively, and
columns 5, 6, 7 contain backward bitconditions
BC(t, abc, g) for those same g’s, respectively. The
parenthesized number next to a triple def is |Udef |, the
amount of freedom left. An entry is left empty if
g /∈ Vabc. See section 4.4.3 for more details.
B.1 Bitconditions applied to boolean function F
Table B-1 Round 1 (0 ≤ t < 16) bitconditions applied to
boolean function F :
F (X,Y, Z) = (X ∧ Y )⊕ (X ∧ Z)
DB Forward bitconditions Backward bitconditions
abc g = 0 g = +1 g = −1 g = 0 g = +1 g = −1
... (8) ... (8) ... (8)
..+ (4) 1.+ (2) 0.+ (2) 1.+ (2) 0.+ (2)
..- (4) 1.- (2) 0.- (2) 1.- (2) 0.- (2)
.+. (4) 0+. (2) 1+. (2) 0+. (2) 1+. (2)
.++ (2) .++ (2) .++ (2)
.+- (2) 1+- (1) 0+- (1) 1+- (1) 0+- (1)
.-. (4) 0-. (2) 1-. (2) 0-. (2) 1-. (2)
.-+ (2) 0-+ (1) 1-+ (1) 0-+ (1) 1-+ (1)
.-- (2) .-- (2) .-- (2)
+.. (4) +.V (2) +10 (1) +01 (1) +^. (2) +10 (1) +01 (1)
+.+ (2) +0+ (1) +1+ (1) +0+ (1) +1+ (1)
+.- (2) +1- (1) +0- (1) +1- (1) +0- (1)
++. (2) ++1 (1) ++0 (1) ++1 (1) ++0 (1)
+++ (1) +++ (1) +++ (1)
++- (1) ++- (1) ++- (1)
+-. (2) +-0 (1) +-1 (1) +-0 (1) +-1 (1)
+-+ (1) +-+ (1) +-+ (1)
+-- (1) +-- (1) +-- (1)
-.. (4) -.V (2) -01 (1) -10 (1) -^. (2) -01 (1) -10 (1)
-.+ (2) -1+ (1) -0+ (1) -1+ (1) -0+ (1)
-.- (2) -0- (1) -1- (1) -0- (1) -1- (1)
-+. (2) -+0 (1) -+1 (1) -+0 (1) -+1 (1)
-++ (1) -++ (1) -++ (1)
-+- (1) -+- (1) -+- (1)
--. (2) --1 (1) --0 (1) --1 (1) --0 (1)
--+ (1) --+ (1) --+ (1)
--- (1) --- (1) --- (1)
B.2 Bitconditions applied to boolean function G
Table B-2 Round 2 (16 ≤ t < 32) bitconditions applied to
boolean function G:
G(X,Y, Z) = (Z ∧X)⊕ (Z ∧ Y )
DB Forward bitconditions Backward bitconditions
abc g = 0 g = +1 g = −1 g = 0 g = +1 g = −1
... (8) ... (8) ... (8)
..+ (4) .V+ (2) 10+ (1) 01+ (1) ^.+ (2) 10+ (1) 01+ (1)
..- (4) .V- (2) 01- (1) 10- (1) ^.- (2) 01- (1) 10- (1)
.+. (4) .+1 (2) .+0 (2) .+1 (2) .+0 (2)
.++ (2) 0++ (1) 1++ (1) 0++ (1) 1++ (1)
.+- (2) 1+- (1) 0+- (1) 1+- (1) 0+- (1)
.-. (4) .-1 (2) .-0 (2) .-1 (2) .-0 (2)
.-+ (2) 1-+ (1) 0-+ (1) 1-+ (1) 0-+ (1)
.-- (2) 0-- (1) 1-- (1) 0-- (1) 1-- (1)
+.. (4) +.0 (2) +.1 (2) +.0 (2) +.1 (2)
+.+ (2) +1+ (1) +0+ (1) +1+ (1) +0+ (1)
+.- (2) +0- (1) +1- (1) +0- (1) +1- (1)
++. (2) ++. (2) ++. (2)
+++ (1) +++ (1) +++ (1)
++- (1) ++- (1) ++- (1)
+-. (2) +-1 (1) +-0 (1) +-1 (1) +-0 (1)
+-+ (1) +-+ (1) +-+ (1)
+-- (1) +-- (1) +-- (1)
-.. (4) -.0 (2) -.1 (2) -.0 (2) -.1 (2)
-.+ (2) -0+ (1) -1+ (1) -0+ (1) -1+ (1)
-.- (2) -1- (1) -0- (1) -1- (1) -0- (1)
-+. (2) -+0 (1) -+1 (1) -+0 (1) -+1 (1)
-++ (1) -++ (1) -++ (1)
-+- (1) -+- (1) -+- (1)
--. (2) --. (2) --. (2)
--+ (1) --+ (1) --+ (1)
--- (1) --- (1) --- (1)
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B.3 Bitconditions applied to boolean function H
Table B-3 Round 3 (32 ≤ t < 48) bitconditions applied to
boolean function H:
H(X,Y, Z) = X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z
DB Forward bitconditions Backward bitconditions
abc g = 0 g = +1 g = −1 g = 0 g = +1 g = −1
... (8) ... (8) ... (8)
..+ (4) .V+ (2) .Y+ (2) ^.+ (2) !.+ (2)
..- (4) .Y- (2) .V- (2) !.- (2) ^.- (2)
.+. (4) .+W (2) .+H (2) m+. (2) #+. (2)
.++ (2) .++ (2) .++ (2)
.+- (2) .+- (2) .+- (2)
.-. (4) .-H (2) .-W (2) #-. (2) m-. (2)
.-+ (2) .-+ (2) .-+ (2)
.-- (2) .-- (2) .-- (2)
+.. (4) +.V (2) +.Y (2) +^. (2) +!. (2)
+.+ (2) +.+ (2) +.+ (2)
+.- (2) +.- (2) +.- (2)
++. (2) ++. (2) ++. (2)
+++ (1) +++ (1) +++ (1)
++- (1) ++- (1) ++- (1)
+-. (2) +-. (2) +-. (2)
+-+ (1) +-+ (1) +-+ (1)
+-- (1) +-- (1) +-- (1)
-.. (4) -.Y (2) -.V (2) -!. (2) -^. (2)
-.+ (2) -.+ (2) -.+ (2)
-.- (2) -.- (2) -.- (2)
-+. (2) -+. (2) -+. (2)
-++ (1) -++ (1) -++ (1)
-+- (1) -+- (1) -+- (1)
--. (2) --. (2) --. (2)
--+ (1) --+ (1) --+ (1)
--- (1) --- (1) --- (1)
B.4 Bitconditions applied to boolean function I
Table B-4 Round 4 (48 ≤ t < 64) bitconditions applied to
boolean function I:
I(X,Y, Z) = Y ⊕ (X ∨ Z)
DB Forward bitconditions Backward bitconditions
abc g = 0 g = +1 g = −1 g = 0 g = +1 g = −1
... (8) ... (8) ... (8)
..+ (4) 1.+ (2) 01+ (1) 00+ (1) 1.+ (2) 01+ (1) 00+ (1)
..- (4) 1.- (2) 00- (1) 01- (1) 1.- (2) 00- (1) 01- (1)
.+. (4) 0+1 (1) .+Q (3) 0+1 (1) ?+. (3)
.++ (2) 0++ (1) 1++ (1) 0++ (1) 1++ (1)
.+- (2) 0+- (1) 1+- (1) 0+- (1) 1+- (1)
.-. (4) .-Q (3) 0-1 (1) ?-. (3) 0-1 (1)
.-+ (2) 0-+ (1) 1-+ (1) 0-+ (1) 1-+ (1)
.-- (2) 0-- (1) 1-- (1) 0-- (1) 1-- (1)
+.. (4) +.0 (2) +01 (1) +11 (1) +.0 (2) +01 (1) +11 (1)
+.+ (2) +.+ (2) +.+ (2)
+.- (2) +0- (1) +1- (1) +0- (1) +1- (1)
++. (2) ++1 (1) ++0 (1) ++1 (1) ++0 (1)
+++ (1) +++ (1) +++ (1)
++- (1) ++- (1) ++- (1)
+-. (2) +-1 (1) +-0 (1) +-1 (1) +-0 (1)
+-+ (1) +-+ (1) +-+ (1)
+-- (1) +-- (1) +-- (1)
-.. (4) -.0 (2) -11 (1) -01 (1) -.0 (2) -11 (1) -01 (1)
-.+ (2) -1+ (1) -0+ (1) -1+ (1) -0+ (1)
-.- (2) -.- (2) -.- (2)
-+. (2) -+1 (1) -+0 (1) -+1 (1) -+0 (1)
-++ (1) -++ (1) -++ (1)
-+- (1) -+- (1) -+- (1)
--. (2) --1 (1) --0 (1) --1 (1) --0 (1)
--+ (1) --+ (1) --+ (1)
--- (1) --- (1) --- (1)
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C Birthday Cost
In this appendix notation and variables are as in Section 4.2. The columns p, Ctr and M denote the values
− log2(pr,k,w), log2(Ctr(r, k, w)) and the minimum required memory such that Ccoll(r, k, w,M) ≤ Ctr(r, k, w),
respectively.
r = 3 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0
4 34.01 51.33 2TB
8 33.42 53.03 748GB 31.31 51.98 174GB
12 34.01 55.33 2TB 32.42 54.53 374GB 30.55 53.6 103GB 28.24 52.44 21GB
16 31. 55.83 141GB 29.65 55.15 55GB 27.36 54.01 12GB 25.6 53.13 4GB
20 27.51 56.08 13GB 26.18 55.42 5GB 24.53 54.59 2GB 23.26 53.96 673MB
24 24.33 56.49 2GB 23.35 56. 714MB 22.17 55.41 315MB 21.19 54.92 160MB
28 21.11 56.88 152MB 20.56 56.6 103MB 19.98 56.32 70MB 19.57 56.11 52MB
32 17.88 57.26 17MB 17.88 57.27 17MB 17.89 57.27 17MB 17.88 57.27 17MB
r = 3 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 31.68 48.17 225GB 30.25 47.45 84GB 28.01 46.33 18GB
4 32.2 50.43 323GB 29.92 49.29 67GB 28.06 48.36 19GB 26.2 47.43 6GB
8 28.83 50.74 32GB 27.33 49.99 11GB 25.88 49.26 5GB 24.47 48.56 2GB
12 26.63 51.64 7GB 25.14 50.9 3GB 23.96 50.3 2GB 22.94 49.8 537MB
16 24.31 52.48 2GB 23.27 51.96 675MB 22.49 51.57 394MB 21.86 51.26 255MB
20 22.28 53.46 340MB 21.62 53.13 215MB 21.14 52.9 155MB 20.73 52.69 117MB
24 20.53 54.59 102MB 20.01 54.33 71MB 19.65 54.15 55MB 19.38 54.01 46MB
28 19.25 55.95 42MB 19.02 55.83 36MB 18.82 55.74 31MB 18.65 55.65 28MB
32 17.88 57.27 17MB 17.88 57.27 17MB 17.88 57.27 17MB 17.88 57.27 17MB
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r = 4 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 34. 49.33 2TB 30.19 47.42 81GB
4 33.42 51.04 749GB 30.36 49.51 90GB 27.59 48.12 14GB
8 35. 53.83 3TB 30.3 51.48 87GB 27.21 49.93 11GB 24.87 48.76 2GB
12 29.58 53.12 53GB 27.53 52.09 13GB 24.59 50.62 2GB 22.47 49.56 388MB
16 26.26 53.45 6GB 24.36 52.51 2GB 22.06 51.36 292MB 20.38 50.51 91MB
20 23.16 53.91 628MB 21.5 53.08 199MB 19.72 52.19 58MB 18.54 51.6 26MB
24 20.25 54.45 84MB 19.09 53.87 38MB 17.8 53.23 16MB 16.86 52.76 8MB
28 17.26 54.95 11MB 16.63 54.64 7MB 16.02 54.34 5MB 15.6 54.13 4MB
32 14.29 55.47 2MB 14.29 55.47 2MB 14.29 55.47 2MB 14.29 55.47 2MB
r = 4 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 26.98 45.81 9GB 24.45 44.55 2GB 22.14 43.4 310MB 20.33 42.49 88MB
4 24.95 46.8 3GB 22.82 45.73 493MB 21.04 44.84 144MB 19.55 44.1 52MB
8 22.63 47.64 432MB 20.92 46.79 133MB 19.58 46.12 53MB 18.56 45.61 26MB
12 20.67 48.66 112MB 19.41 48.03 47MB 18.45 47.55 24MB 17.71 47.18 15MB
16 19.08 49.86 37MB 18.19 49.42 21MB 17.56 49.1 13MB 17.08 48.86 10MB
20 17.66 51.16 14MB 17.09 50.87 10MB 16.7 50.67 8MB 16.39 50.52 6MB
24 16.25 52.45 6MB 15.82 52.24 4MB 15.54 52.09 4MB 15.33 51.99 3MB
28 15.31 53.98 3MB 15.09 53.87 3MB 14.93 53.79 3MB 14.78 53.72 2MB
32 14.29 55.47 2MB 14.29 55.47 2MB 14.29 55.47 2MB 14.29 55.47 2MB
r = 5 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 35. 49.83 3TB 31.2 47.92 161GB 27.13 45.89 10GB 23.74 44.2 938MB
4 33.42 51.04 749GB 28.47 48.56 25GB 24.63 46.64 2GB 21.58 45.12 210MB
8 28.61 50.63 27GB 25.61 49.13 4GB 22. 47.33 280MB 19.39 46.02 46MB
12 25.43 51.04 3GB 22.74 49.7 468MB 19.66 48.15 56MB 17.53 47.09 13MB
16 22.36 51.51 360MB 20.02 50.34 72MB 17.59 49.12 14MB 15.95 48.3 5MB
20 19.38 52.01 46MB 17.48 51.07 13MB 15.67 50.16 4MB 14.55 49.6 2MB
24 16.68 52.66 7MB 15.35 52. 3MB 14.06 51.36 2MB 13.17 50.91 1MB
28 13.92 53.29 2MB 13.22 52.93 1MB 12.61 52.63 1MB 12.21 52.43 1MB
32 11.2 53.92 1MB 11.2 53.93 1MB 11.2 53.92 1MB 11.2 53.93 1MB
r = 5 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 20.53 42.59 102MB 18.03 41.34 18MB 16.17 40.41 5MB 14.92 39.79 3MB
4 18.94 43.79 34MB 17. 42.82 9MB 15.57 42.11 4MB 14.53 41.59 2MB
8 17.27 44.96 11MB 15.79 44.22 4MB 14.75 43.7 2MB 14.01 43.33 2MB
12 15.92 46.28 5MB 14.84 45.75 2MB 14.09 45.37 2MB 13.56 45.11 1MB
16 14.8 47.73 2MB 14.06 47.35 2MB 13.55 47.1 1MB 13.18 46.92 1MB
20 13.79 49.22 1MB 13.31 48.98 1MB 12.99 48.82 1MB 12.76 48.7 1MB
24 12.64 50.64 1MB 12.29 50.47 1MB 12.07 50.36 1MB 11.91 50.28 1MB
28 11.95 52.3 1MB 11.76 52.2 1MB 11.62 52.14 1MB 11.5 52.07 1MB
32 11.2 53.92 1MB 11.2 53.93 1MB 11.2 53.92 1MB 11.2 53.93 1MB
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r = 6 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 31.2 47.92 161GB 26.73 45.69 8GB 21.78 43.22 241MB 18.14 41.4 20MB
4 28.18 48.42 20GB 23.89 46.27 2GB 19.56 44.11 52MB 16.46 42.55 6MB
8 24.66 48.66 2GB 21.17 46.91 158MB 17.37 45.01 12MB 14.79 43.72 2MB
12 21.67 49.16 224MB 18.6 47.62 27MB 15.43 46.04 3MB 13.4 45.03 1MB
16 18.82 49.74 31MB 16.21 48.43 6MB 13.74 47.2 1MB 12.23 46.44 1MB
20 16.03 50.34 5MB 13.97 49.31 2MB 12.2 48.43 1MB 11.18 47.92 1MB
24 13.54 51.1 1MB 12.11 50.38 1MB 10.86 49.75 1MB 10.04 49.35 1MB
28 11.03 51.84 1MB 10.28 51.47 1MB 9.69 51.17 1MB 9.33 50.99 1MB
32 8.56 52.6 1MB 8.56 52.6 1MB 8.56 52.6 1MB 8.56 52.6 1MB
r = 6 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 15.12 39.88 3MB 13.05 38.85 1MB 11.73 38.19 1MB 10.91 37.78 1MB
4 14.05 41.35 2MB 12.44 40.55 1MB 11.39 40.02 1MB 10.7 39.68 1MB
8 12.92 42.79 1MB 11.73 42.19 1MB 10.95 41.8 1MB 10.44 41.54 1MB
12 12.01 44.33 1MB 11.14 43.9 1MB 10.57 43.61 1MB 10.2 43.42 1MB
16 11.25 45.95 1MB 10.64 45.64 1MB 10.24 45.45 1MB 9.98 45.32 1MB
20 10.53 47.59 1MB 10.14 47.39 1MB 9.89 47.27 1MB 9.72 47.19 1MB
24 9.59 49.12 1MB 9.31 48.98 1MB 9.14 48.9 1MB 9.04 48.85 1MB
28 9.09 50.87 1MB 8.93 50.79 1MB 8.82 50.74 1MB 8.73 50.69 1MB
32 8.56 52.6 1MB 8.56 52.6 1MB 8.56 52.6 1MB 8.56 52.6 1MB
r = 7 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 26.82 45.73 8GB 22.2 43.43 323MB 17.02 40.83 9MB 13.4 39.02 1MB
4 24.02 46.34 2GB 19.68 44.16 56MB 15.16 41.9 3MB 12.18 40.41 1MB
8 21.1 46.88 151MB 17.23 44.94 11MB 13.37 43.01 1MB 10.97 41.81 1MB
12 18.32 47.49 22MB 14.96 45.8 3MB 11.82 44.24 1MB 9.98 43.31 1MB
16 15.67 48.16 4MB 12.87 46.76 1MB 10.48 45.56 1MB 9.13 44.89 1MB
20 13.1 48.88 1MB 10.93 47.79 1MB 9.26 46.95 1MB 8.35 46.5 1MB
24 10.82 49.74 1MB 9.32 48.99 1MB 8.15 48.4 1MB 7.43 48.04 1MB
28 8.56 50.6 1MB 7.78 50.22 1MB 7.23 49.94 1MB 6.91 49.78 1MB
32 6.34 51.5 1MB 6.34 51.5 1MB 6.34 51.5 1MB 6.34 51.5 1MB
r = 7 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 10.8 37.73 1MB 9.25 36.95 1MB 8.35 36.5 1MB 7.84 36.25 1MB
4 10.13 39.39 1MB 8.9 38.78 1MB 8.17 38.41 1MB 7.74 38.19 1MB
8 9.42 41.03 1MB 8.5 40.57 1MB 7.94 40.3 1MB 7.61 40.13 1MB
12 8.82 42.74 1MB 8.15 42.4 1MB 7.74 42.19 1MB 7.48 42.07 1MB
16 8.31 44.48 1MB 7.84 44.24 1MB 7.55 44.1 1MB 7.37 44.01 1MB
20 7.82 46.23 1MB 7.51 46.08 1MB 7.32 45.99 1MB 7.21 45.93 1MB
24 7.06 47.86 1MB 6.84 47.75 1MB 6.72 47.69 1MB 6.66 47.65 1MB
28 6.71 49.68 1MB 6.58 49.62 1MB 6.5 49.58 1MB 6.43 49.54 1MB
32 6.34 51.5 1MB 6.34 51.5 1MB 6.34 51.5 1MB 6.34 51.5 1MB
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r = 8 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 23.39 44.02 732MB 18.21 41.43 21MB 12.88 38.76 1MB 9.52 37.09 1MB
4 20.57 44.61 105MB 15.94 42.29 5MB 11.39 40.02 1MB 8.69 38.67 1MB
8 17.91 45.28 17MB 13.77 43.21 1MB 9.99 41.32 1MB 7.86 40.26 1MB
12 15.35 46. 3MB 11.78 44.22 1MB 8.79 42.72 1MB 7.17 41.91 1MB
16 12.91 46.78 1MB 10. 45.32 1MB 7.75 44.2 1MB 6.59 43.62 1MB
20 10.56 47.61 1MB 8.35 46.5 1MB 6.81 45.73 1MB 6.03 45.34 1MB
24 8.49 48.57 1MB 6.97 47.81 1MB 5.91 47.28 1MB 5.29 46.97 1MB
28 6.48 49.56 1MB 5.71 49.18 1MB 5.21 48.93 1MB 4.93 48.79 1MB
32 4.54 50.6 1MB 4.54 50.6 1MB 4.54 50.6 1MB 4.54 50.6 1MB
r = 8 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 7.45 36.05 1MB 6.37 35.51 1MB 5.8 35.23 1MB 5.5 35.08 1MB
4 7.06 37.85 1MB 6.18 37.42 1MB 5.71 37.18 1MB 5.45 37.05 1MB
8 6.63 39.64 1MB 5.96 39.31 1MB 5.6 39.12 1MB 5.39 39.02 1MB
12 6.26 41.46 1MB 5.77 41.21 1MB 5.49 41.07 1MB 5.34 40.99 1MB
16 5.94 43.29 1MB 5.59 43.12 1MB 5.39 43.02 1MB 5.28 42.97 1MB
20 5.61 45.13 1MB 5.38 45.01 1MB 5.25 44.95 1MB 5.18 44.92 1MB
24 5.01 46.83 1MB 4.85 46.75 1MB 4.77 46.71 1MB 4.73 46.69 1MB
28 4.78 48.71 1MB 4.68 48.67 1MB 4.62 48.64 1MB 4.58 48.62 1MB
32 4.54 50.6 1MB 4.54 50.6 1MB 4.54 50.6 1MB 4.54 50.6 1MB
r = 9 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 20.16 42.4 79MB 14.62 39.64 2MB 9.38 37.02 1MB 6.46 35.56 1MB
4 17.56 43.1 13MB 12.63 40.64 1MB 8.26 38.45 1MB 5.93 37.29 1MB
8 15.09 43.87 3MB 10.75 41.7 1MB 7.2 39.92 1MB 5.41 39.03 1MB
12 12.73 44.69 1MB 9.06 42.86 1MB 6.3 41.47 1MB 4.96 40.81 1MB
16 10.51 45.58 1MB 7.57 44.11 1MB 5.53 43.09 1MB 4.57 42.61 1MB
20 8.39 46.52 1MB 6.2 45.43 1MB 4.83 44.74 1MB 4.2 44.42 1MB
24 6.53 47.59 1MB 5.05 46.85 1MB 4.12 46.39 1MB 3.63 46.14 1MB
28 4.77 48.71 1MB 4.05 48.35 1MB 3.61 48.13 1MB 3.4 48.02 1MB
32 3.14 49.9 1MB 3.14 49.9 1MB 3.14 49.9 1MB 3.14 49.9 1MB
r = 9 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 4.95 34.8 1MB 4.25 34.45 1MB 3.92 34.28 1MB 3.76 34.21 1MB
4 4.73 36.69 1MB 4.15 36.4 1MB 3.87 36.26 1MB 3.74 36.2 1MB
8 4.49 38.57 1MB 4.04 38.35 1MB 3.82 38.24 1MB 3.72 38.18 1MB
12 4.28 40.47 1MB 3.94 40.3 1MB 3.78 40.21 1MB 3.69 40.17 1MB
16 4.09 42.37 1MB 3.85 42.25 1MB 3.73 42.19 1MB 3.67 42.16 1MB
20 3.88 44.27 1MB 3.72 44.19 1MB 3.64 44.15 1MB 3.6 44.13 1MB
24 3.42 46.04 1MB 3.32 45.99 1MB 3.27 45.96 1MB 3.25 45.95 1MB
28 3.28 47.97 1MB 3.21 47.93 1MB 3.18 47.92 1MB 3.16 47.9 1MB
32 3.14 49.9 1MB 3.14 49.9 1MB 3.14 49.9 1MB 3.14 49.9 1MB
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r = 10 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 17.28 40.97 11MB 11.47 38.06 1MB 6.54 35.6 1MB 4.18 34.42 1MB
4 14.87 41.76 3MB 9.77 39.21 1MB 5.73 37.19 1MB 3.87 36.26 1MB
8 12.6 42.63 1MB 8.18 40.42 1MB 4.97 38.81 1MB 3.56 38.11 1MB
12 10.45 43.55 1MB 6.79 41.72 1MB 4.34 40.49 1MB 3.3 39.97 1MB
16 8.45 44.55 1MB 5.57 43.11 1MB 3.8 42.22 1MB 3.06 41.86 1MB
20 6.56 45.61 1MB 4.48 44.56 1MB 3.31 43.98 1MB 2.83 43.74 1MB
24 4.92 46.79 1MB 3.53 46.09 1MB 2.78 45.71 1MB 2.42 45.53 1MB
28 3.44 48.04 1MB 2.78 47.72 1MB 2.44 47.54 1MB 2.28 47.47 1MB
32 2.13 49.39 1MB 2.13 49.39 1MB 2.13 49.39 1MB 2.13 49.39 1MB
r = 10 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 3.17 33.91 1MB 2.77 33.71 1MB 2.6 33.62 1MB 2.53 33.59 1MB
4 3.06 35.85 1MB 2.72 35.69 1MB 2.58 35.62 1MB 2.52 35.59 1MB
8 2.94 37.8 1MB 2.68 37.66 1MB 2.56 37.61 1MB 2.51 37.58 1MB
12 2.83 39.74 1MB 2.63 39.64 1MB 2.54 39.6 1MB 2.5 39.58 1MB
16 2.73 41.69 1MB 2.59 41.62 1MB 2.52 41.59 1MB 2.49 41.57 1MB
20 2.61 43.63 1MB 2.51 43.58 1MB 2.47 43.56 1MB 2.45 43.55 1MB
24 2.28 45.47 1MB 2.22 45.44 1MB 2.2 45.42 1MB 2.19 45.42 1MB
28 2.2 47.43 1MB 2.16 47.41 1MB 2.15 47.4 1MB 2.14 47.39 1MB
32 2.13 49.39 1MB 2.13 49.39 1MB 2.13 49.39 1MB 2.13 49.39 1MB
r = 11 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 14.72 39.68 2MB 8.77 36.71 1MB 4.34 34.5 1MB 2.61 33.63 1MB
4 12.5 40.58 1MB 7.36 38. 1MB 3.8 36.23 1MB 2.45 35.55 1MB
8 10.43 41.54 1MB 6.06 39.36 1MB 3.3 37.98 1MB 2.29 37.47 1MB
12 8.49 42.57 1MB 4.94 40.8 1MB 2.89 39.77 1MB 2.15 39.4 1MB
16 6.7 43.68 1MB 3.98 42.32 1MB 2.54 41.59 1MB 2.02 41.34 1MB
20 5.06 44.86 1MB 3.15 43.9 1MB 2.22 43.44 1MB 1.89 43.27 1MB
24 3.64 46.15 1MB 2.42 45.54 1MB 1.86 45.25 1MB 1.63 45.14 1MB
28 2.44 47.54 1MB 1.91 47.28 1MB 1.66 47.16 1MB 1.56 47.11 1MB
32 1.49 49.07 1MB 1.49 49.07 1MB 1.49 49.07 1MB 1.49 49.07 1MB
r = 11 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 2.02 33.33 1MB 1.82 33.24 1MB 1.75 33.2 1MB 1.73 33.19 1MB
4 1.97 35.31 1MB 1.81 35.23 1MB 1.75 35.2 1MB 1.72 35.19 1MB
8 1.92 37.29 1MB 1.79 37.22 1MB 1.74 37.2 1MB 1.72 37.19 1MB
12 1.87 39.26 1MB 1.77 39.21 1MB 1.73 39.19 1MB 1.72 39.19 1MB
16 1.83 41.24 1MB 1.75 41.2 1MB 1.73 41.19 1MB 1.72 41.18 1MB
20 1.76 43.21 1MB 1.71 43.18 1MB 1.7 43.17 1MB 1.69 43.17 1MB
24 1.55 45.1 1MB 1.52 45.09 1MB 1.52 45.08 1MB 1.51 45.08 1MB
28 1.52 47.09 1MB 1.5 47.08 1MB 1.49 47.07 1MB 1.49 47.07 1MB
32 1.49 49.07 1MB 1.49 49.07 1MB 1.49 49.07 1MB 1.49 49.07 1MB
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r = 12 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 12.45 38.55 1MB 6.53 35.59 1MB 2.78 33.71 1MB 1.66 33.16 1MB
4 10.43 39.54 1MB 5.39 37.02 1MB 2.45 35.55 1MB 1.59 35.12 1MB
8 8.55 40.6 1MB 4.37 38.51 1MB 2.15 37.4 1MB 1.52 37.09 1MB
12 6.81 41.73 1MB 3.51 40.08 1MB 1.91 39.28 1MB 1.46 39.06 1MB
16 5.24 42.95 1MB 2.8 41.72 1MB 1.71 41.18 1MB 1.41 41.03 1MB
20 3.85 44.25 1MB 2.2 43.43 1MB 1.54 43.09 1MB 1.35 43. 1MB
24 2.66 45.66 1MB 1.69 45.17 1MB 1.32 44.98 1MB 1.2 44.93 1MB
28 1.75 47.2 1MB 1.37 47.01 1MB 1.23 46.94 1MB 1.18 46.92 1MB
32 1.15 48.9 1MB 1.15 48.9 1MB 1.15 48.9 1MB 1.15 48.9 1MB
r = 12 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 1.38 33.02 1MB 1.3 32.98 1MB 1.28 32.97 1MB 1.28 32.96 1MB
4 1.36 35.01 1MB 1.3 34.98 1MB 1.28 34.97 1MB 1.28 34.96 1MB
8 1.35 37. 1MB 1.3 36.97 1MB 1.28 36.97 1MB 1.28 36.96 1MB
12 1.33 38.99 1MB 1.29 38.97 1MB 1.28 38.96 1MB 1.27 38.96 1MB
16 1.31 40.98 1MB 1.29 40.97 1MB 1.28 40.96 1MB 1.27 40.96 1MB
20 1.29 42.97 1MB 1.27 42.96 1MB 1.26 42.96 1MB 1.26 42.95 1MB
24 1.17 44.91 1MB 1.16 44.91 1MB 1.16 44.91 1MB 1.16 44.91 1MB
28 1.16 46.91 1MB 1.16 46.9 1MB 1.15 46.9 1MB 1.15 46.9 1MB
32 1.15 48.9 1MB 1.15 48.9 1MB 1.15 48.9 1MB 1.15 48.9 1MB
r = 13 w = 0 w = 1 w = 2 w = 3
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 10.45 37.55 1MB 4.73 34.69 1MB 1.78 33.22 1MB 1.2 32.93 1MB
4 8.62 38.64 1MB 3.86 36.26 1MB 1.62 35.13 1MB 1.18 34.91 1MB
8 6.93 39.79 1MB 3.09 37.87 1MB 1.47 37.06 1MB 1.15 36.9 1MB
12 5.41 41.03 1MB 2.47 39.56 1MB 1.35 39. 1MB 1.13 38.89 1MB
16 4.06 42.35 1MB 1.98 41.31 1MB 1.26 40.95 1MB 1.12 40.88 1MB
20 2.91 43.78 1MB 1.59 43.12 1MB 1.18 42.92 1MB 1.1 42.87 1MB
24 1.96 45.31 1MB 1.27 44.96 1MB 1.08 44.87 1MB 1.04 44.85 1MB
28 1.33 46.99 1MB 1.11 46.88 1MB 1.05 46.85 1MB 1.03 46.84 1MB
32 1.03 48.84 1MB 1.03 48.84 1MB 1.03 48.84 1MB 1.03 48.84 1MB
r = 13 w = 4 w = 5 w = 6 w = 7
k p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M p Ctr M
0 1.1 32.88 1MB 1.08 32.87 1MB 1.08 32.86 1MB 1.08 32.86 1MB
4 1.1 34.87 1MB 1.08 34.87 1MB 1.08 34.86 1MB 1.08 34.86 1MB
8 1.09 36.87 1MB 1.08 36.87 1MB 1.08 36.86 1MB 1.08 36.86 1MB
12 1.09 38.87 1MB 1.08 38.87 1MB 1.08 38.86 1MB 1.08 38.86 1MB
16 1.09 40.87 1MB 1.08 40.86 1MB 1.08 40.86 1MB 1.08 40.86 1MB
20 1.08 42.86 1MB 1.07 42.86 1MB 1.07 42.86 1MB 1.07 42.86 1MB
24 1.03 44.84 1MB 1.03 44.84 1MB 1.03 44.84 1MB 1.03 44.84 1MB
28 1.03 46.84 1MB 1.03 46.84 1MB 1.03 46.84 1MB 1.03 46.84 1MB
32 1.03 48.84 1MB 1.03 48.84 1MB 1.03 48.84 1MB 1.03 48.84 1MB
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